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ABSTRACT 
Presidential commissions, the Congress, and numerous national law enforcement groups 
have noted that the unfettered collection and sharing of intelligence is key to the 
prevention and mitigation of terrorism in the United States. The sharing of classified 
national security intelligence collected by the United States Intelligence Community with 
nonfederal law enforcement is, however, problematic, particularly since the tragic events 
of September 11, 2001. This thesis examines problems associated with the collection and 
sharing of classified national security intelligence with and by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement. It explores four policy options for the collection and sharing of national 
security intelligence, including Intelligence-led Policing, Nationwide Suspicious 
Activities Reporting Initiative; the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force/the National 
Counterterrorism Center; National Fusion Center; and the British Special Branch system. 
It recommends an American adaptation of the British Security Service and Metropolitan 
Police Service Special Branch model meant to improve the sharing of classified national 
security intelligence vital to the protection of the homeland. The recommendations in this 
thesis are designed to promote a debate on the utility and feasibility of classified national 
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The story is well known. On September 11, 2001, the spectacular success of al-
Qa’ida in conducting attacks within the homeland—and the failure of the United States 
Intelligence Community to prevent those attacks—altered the definition of threats to 
national security (Newman, 2002). Nineteen foreign nationals, all members of a 
clandestine international terrorist group known for large-scale coordinated attacks 
(Mefford, 2003), entered this country undetected and covertly lived among us for months, 
utilizing tradecraft of such sophistication subsequent investigation failed to reveal any 
major flaws in the hijacker’s operational security (Ilardi, 2009). The 19 individuals 
involved in the plot organized and rehearsed a plan of unprecedented scale. They 
commandeered four commercial airliners without encountering significant impediments 
(Wright, 2006) and turned each airliner into improvised mass casualty weapons without 
any operationally meaningful warning from the nation's foreign or domestic intelligence 
agencies (9/11 Commission Report, 2004).1 All of the various agencies responsible for 
national security and civilian law enforcement were stunned by the audacious nature of 
the attacks. Each resolved to never let it happen again. 
Immediately following the devastating strike, the nation focused all of its 
intelligence collection efforts on the prevention of future attacks. Despite efforts to 
neutralize its leadership, al-Qa’ida “remained a potent, highly capable and extremely 
dangerous terrorist network” (Mefford, 2003),2 and the major national security threat to 
the homeland. To prevent further attacks, legal and preventive measures were 
implemented, which caused a great deal of angst and concern over the “erosion of civil 
liberties” (An Erosion of Civil Liberties, New York Times, 2002). Plans, programs and 
policies were also initiated to attempt to harness the domestic intelligence collection 
                                                 
1 Formally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report. Hereafter referred to as “9/11 Commission” and “9/11 Commission Report.” 
2 Subsequent events, including the killing of Usama bin Laden and a number of his senior associates, 
has rendered al-Qa’ida core a shattered remnant of its former self, and in the view of some, no longer a 
significant threat to the homeland. 
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potential of state, local and tribal law enforcement to battle the now clear threat posed by 
transnational terrorist organizations (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002). 
How did such a clear-cut failure of strategic and tactical intelligence occur? Who, 
if anyone, was to blame? What steps were necessary to ensure an event like the attacks of 
9/11 never happened again? Could the United States Intelligence Community embrace 
tactical and strategic change so sweeping as to represent a major paradigm shift in its 
core functions? These were the fundamental questions facing the 9/11 Commission when 
it created its findings and recommendations after more than two years of hearings, studies 
and investigations.  
To pursue these wide-reaching goals, President Bush initiated significant changes 
to both the investigative and intelligence structure of the Executive Branch, resulting in 
the “largest reorganization efforts [sic] since the passing of the National Security Act of 
1947. In a single piece of legislation, twenty-two [sic] separate organizations were 
brought together to form the Department of Homeland Security” (Clovis, 2006, p. 1). 
This new cabinet–level department was “composed of nearly 180,000 federal employees, 
drawn from parts or all of twenty-two units of government, including the Coast Guard, 
the Secret Service, elements of the Department of Justice, INS [sic], security guards at 
airports, and Customs” (Ridge 2008, p.131). 
Nine separate national strategies were written to address elements of homeland 
security. They include, in part, a National Counterintelligence Strategy (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2009), a National Intelligence Strategy (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2005), a National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(White House, 2007), a National Security Strategy of the United States (White House, 
2010), a National Counterterrorism Strategy (White House, 2011) and most recently a 
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (White House, 2012), but 
significantly no national strategy regarding the collection of domestic intelligence, 
classified or otherwise. Each strategy attempted to aggregate the country’s response to 
the threat of further terrorist attacks. A separate military command, United States 
Northern Command, was created “to provide command and control of Department of 
Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities” 
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(U.S. Northern Command, n.d.). Congress passed legislation to ensure the convergence 
of intelligence and law enforcement (IRTPA, 2004) 3  and took steps to ensure the 
Intelligence Community never again took their collective eyes off the terrorism ball. 
Ten years later—despite all of the training and oversight Congress and the United 
States Intelligence Community can provide—the problem remains how to collect, share 
and understand classified national security intelligence as part of a coherent “intelligence 
enterprise as it relates to counterterrorism” (Cilluffo, Clark & Downing, 2011, p. 1). The 
problem continues to reverberate among the members of the domestic law enforcement 
and United States Intelligence Community. Can the United States Intelligence 
Community leverage state, local and tribal law enforcement in the collection and sharing 
of domestic classified national security intelligence to prevent future 9/11 type attacks 
from occurring? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In an effort to seek greater relevance in the post-9/11 zeitgeist, state, local and 
tribal law enforcement evolved from blindly focusing on participation in federally-led, 
regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to searching for newer and more robust, self-
directed policy models associated with the collection and sharing of classified domestic 
national security intelligence. What those policy models are, which is most effective, how 
they compare with the status quo and whether or not state, local and tribal law 
enforcement should be involved in their implementation and use is the focus of this 
thesis. 
This thesis examines and analyzes the status quo, plus three policy models 
associated with the collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence 
pursuant to classified intelligence collection requirements. It looks primarily at options 
that already are a matter of public discussion. The policy models included in the study are 
the Intelligence-Led Policing and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative as 
the status quo; the National Counterterrorism Center and National Fusion Center model; 
                                                 
3 Formally, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 
December 17, 2004, Title 50 United States Code, §401. Hereafter, referenced as the IRTPA, 2004. 
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force model; and the British 
Security Service (MI-5), Special Branch model of classified domestic intelligence 
collection. Each of these was considered as a potential dominant policy model that could 
be implemented or further adapted to increase the production and sharing of classified 
national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
This thesis also examines, to a lesser degree, the status quo regarding state, local 
and tribal law enforcement’s perceptions regarding how classification issues have 
affected their ability to collect national security intelligence. A concomitant problem 
associated with the evaluation of policies and processes for the collection and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence within the continental United States included 
issues associated with clearances, classification, sources and methods and the need to 
know. 
The attacks by al-Qa’ida created a critical need to incorporate state, local and 
tribal law enforcement and the private sector into the general national security 
intelligence community. This thesis does not, however, examine the role the private 
sector can play in the collection of classified national security intelligence in support of 
overall United States Intelligence Community efforts.4 
As far back as 1996, the Congress of the United States recognized that 
“intelligence and law enforcement communities have maintained an uneven, and at times 
an antagonistic relationship” (United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
1996).5 Investigations into improper domestic intelligence collection activities during the 
1970s resulted in allegations of overreaching and illegal action by intelligence agencies 
into domestic areas (Rafalko, 2011). Subsequent Congressional investigations and the 
resulting statutes both restricted the domestic collection activity of covert United States 
intelligence agencies and expanded the extraterritorial responsibilities of federal law 
                                                 
4 While the private sector may have a role in the collection of domestic national security intelligence, 
for example in the cyber sector, this thesis addresses only those questions associated with the collection of 
national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
5 The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was created by the Senate in 1976 to 
“oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States 
Government” (SSCI, 2011). Hereafter, referred to as the SSCI.  
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enforcement agencies (Rockefeller Commission Report, 1975).6 These laws also required 
law enforcement activity by federal agencies into areas of significant national intelligence 
interest—narco-trafficking, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (SSCI, 1976). 
Other factors bringing intelligence and law enforcement agencies closer together 
after 9/11 are traditional crime issues, such as international organized crime, illegal 
immigration, financial institution fraud and money laundering. Policymakers increasingly 
view domestic law enforcement issues as threats to national security and bona fide 
intelligence collection topics. 
Nevertheless, it was the tragic events of 9/11 that served as the catalyst for greater 
integration of state, local and tribal law enforcement into the United States Intelligence 
Community. In the final version of The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), the Commission 
accused the intelligence community of having failed to “connect the dots” (p. 408) and 
“share information” (pp. 257, 356, 400, 539). Many within the intelligence community 
viewed this claim as an over-simplification of the complexities of national security 
intelligence collection and analysis. 
In some contexts, however, the claim was quite appropriate due to the significant 
issues surrounding the coordination, collection and sharing of classified domestic 
national security intelligence. This was particularly true when applied to the relationship 
between the federal law enforcement and state, local and tribal law enforcement in 
regards to the collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence between 
domestic agencies. 
The 9/11 Commission was not alone in its findings. Other commissions and 
reports, including the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report (2005);7 the 
Congress, through its legislative process (IRTPA, 2004); the Gilmore Commission 
                                                 
6 Formally, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1975. Hereafter, referred to as the “Rockefeller 
Commission Report.” 
7 Formally, Final Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C., 2005. Hereafter, referred to as “WMD 
Commission” and “WMD Commission Report.” 
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Report (2004); 8  and even the Executive Office of the President, via the President’s 
Intelligence Oversight Board (Eggen, 2005) would eventually weigh in on the problem. 
The intelligence collection capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and other members of the United States Intelligence Community 
were questioned and significantly impacted by the creation of a myriad of critiques, 
comments, recommendations and mandates. Yet, no one set of recommendations and 
guidelines purported to have all the answers. 
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 to reform the United States Intelligence Community (IRTPA, 2004). The Act 
included a new definition of national intelligence. All intelligence “[was] now defined as 
national intelligence, which has three subsets, foreign, domestic and homeland security 
intelligence” (Lowenthal 2009, pp. 4–5). Lowenthal noted, “Practitioners are 
experiencing some difficulty distinguishing among homeland, internal and domestic 
security” (p. 5). 
With this new definition of national intelligence, the collection focus of the 
homeland security law enforcement community changed. Intelligence reform gave rise to 
a proliferation of law enforcement intelligence centers, fusion centers, independent state 
and local police and military intelligence gathering units in the post-9/11 environment, 
which posed a potential conflict with the United States Intelligence Community and—
according to some—a risk domestically to civil liberties (Rollins, 2008). 
State and local intelligence units, while not officially added to the existing 17 
members of the United States Intelligence Community overseen by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, were conducting counterterrorism intelligence 
collection within the United States and in some cases worldwide.9 Each perceived their 
role in the collection of domestic intelligence differently, depending on whether they 
                                                 
8 Formally, The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C., 2004. Hereafter, referred to as “the Gilmore 
Commission” and “the Gilmore Commission Report.” 
9 The Los Angeles Police Department and the New York Police Department are two high profile 
advocates of the “world-wide” police intelligence collection approach. See John Comiskey, Effective State, 
Local and Tribal Police Intelligence: The New York City Police Department's Intelligence Enterprise- a 
Smart Practice, 2010, for a more in depth discussion. 
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were civilian or military, the threat to their domains, legislative mandates and frequently 
political considerations. Each member of the greater intelligence community also defined 
what constituted domestic intelligence and its classified collection differently. The 
differences of opinion and perceptions in how classified domestic intelligence was to be 
defined and collected became problematic over time due to the eventual inherent conflict 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s own legislatively mandated domestic 
intelligence collection and counterterrorism investigative programs. 
B. STATUS QUO 
A majority of homeland security professionals agree that a critical need exists 
within law enforcement for an integrated system to enhance the collection and sharing of 
counterterrorism intelligence. Efforts by state, local and tribal law enforcement to seek 
relevance post-9/11 resulted in numerous attempts to develop new and innovative 
intelligence-collection policy models involving greater analysis and information sharing. 
As state, local and tribal law enforcement level agencies reorganized around the 
counterterrorism and homeland security missions, police intelligence resources shifted 
from the investigation of criminal enterprises to the detection and prevention of terrorist 
attacks (Masse, O’Neil & Rollins, 2007). 
In an effort to address the issue of domestic intelligence collection within the 
homeland, two specific, unclassified intelligence-collection policy models, Intelligence-
Led Policing 10  and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) 11 
emerged as the dominant nonfederal, national domestic intelligence collection 
strategies—the new paradigms—driving the nascent field of Homeland Security 
Intelligence. They have become—ten years after the events of 9/11—the de facto status 
quo for intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
                                                 
10 Intelligence-Led Policing is defined as “a strategic, future-oriented, and targeted approach to crime 
control, focusing upon the identification, analysis and management of persisting and developing problems 
or risks (de Lint, 2006, pp. 1–6). 
11 The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is defined as “a nationwide capacity for 
gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing and sharing terrorism related suspicious activities reports 
generated at the local regional, state or federal levels,”  (ISE.Gov, 2008). 
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Intelligence-Led Policing is supported by the membership of the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (2002), the Major City Chiefs Association (2008), the 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (2005) and the 
Department of Homeland Security (Privacy Impact Assessment, 2008), as well as by the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (Kiernan, 2006). 
The various supporters of the American versions of Intelligence-Led Policing 
assert reliance on the information gathering capabilities of the 800,000 plus police 
officers and 18,000 police and sheriff’s departments across the country to collect criminal 
intelligence and leverage data analysis will inherently develop domestic national security 
intelligence (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005). Information collection 
by police, in turn, will lead to the discovery of terror networks by state, local and tribal 
law enforcement agencies and result in the prevention of terrorist acts (Major City Chiefs 
Association, 2008). Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative represent the latest attempt by domestic law enforcement to integrate 
intelligence collection and analysis into a coordinated Information and Intelligence-
Sharing Environment (2010). 
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO 
Intelligence-Led Policing is commonly understood by local police agencies to be 
“primarily a business model and information-management process that allows police 
commanders to understand crime problems in a more strategic manner, and thus make 
more informed decisions to combat criminality” (Ratcliffe, 2008, p.188). The Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (2008) complements Intelligence-Led Policing 
by requiring the submission of a suspicious activity report to the local fusion center 
whenever law enforcement observations meet a certain investigative or intelligence 
standard of relevance.  
While Intelligence-Led Policing is conceptually understood by police executives 
as a policy model for the prevention of crime, the Intelligence-Led Policing policy model  
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does not address the collection, analysis and sharing of classified national security 
intelligence (Department of Homeland Security, 2005) for the prevention of terrorism 
within the United States. 
For purposes of this thesis, Intelligence-Led Policing—as an intelligence-
collection policy model—is considered distinct from counterintelligence, which is not 
motivated by the occurrence of criminal activity, but rather by the need to investigate 
espionage, sedition and subversion related to national security concerns (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998, revised 2003). Counterintelligence—and its related 
discipline counterterrorism—are, however, well-established and understood intelligence-
collection policy models utilized by federal law enforcement to address national security. 
The primary problem with Intelligence-Led Policing—despite having been around 
since 1995—is that it has not been universally adopted and remains a nascent theoretical 
model for most domestic police agencies. A general lack of understanding by police 
executives regarding the purpose and limitations of Intelligence-Led Policing—as well as 
a lack of understanding of the nature, function and limitations of classified national 
security intelligence—has inhibited law enforcement’s ability to effectively collect, 
analyze and disseminate classified domestic national security intelligence. Significantly, 
Intelligence-Led Policing lacks a universal doctrine or concept of operations (Carter, 
2008) by which police can standardize intelligence collection and sharing practices. 
Other problems associated with the status quo flow from the proliferation of all-
crimes/all hazards fusion centers, joint regional intelligence centers and police 
intelligence units. The expansion of police intelligence roles created significant discord 
within the traditional United States Intelligence Community. Local agencies often 
differed with the intelligence community members regarding the who and how of national 
security intelligence collection and analysis and what should be the priority:  detection 
and prevention, or collection, analysis and exploitation.  
This disconnect is primarily a function of competing priorities between domestic 
law enforcement and the federal intelligence community, created by the inevitable 
tendency of coercive federalism to nationalize security, intelligence collection and 
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counterterrorism law (Kincaid, 1990, cited in Clovis, 2006) to the detriment of 
collaboration and sharing. In addition, homeland security grant programs continue to 
greatly influence intelligence collection and homeland security through “stringent 
compliance” that “allows the national government to coerce needed behaviors through 
the power of redistribution of funds.” In this way, “State and local governments had 
become dependent on federal funding” (Clovis, 2006, p. 6). 
These issues are highlighted in regards to how state, local and tribal law 
enforcement understand classified national security intelligence collection, the principles 
of classification to protect sources and methods and the doctrine of need to know. The 
problems associated with the collection and sharing of domestic classified national 
security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement are exacerbated by the lack 
of classified and unclassified domestic intelligence collection requirements propagated by 
the United States Intelligence Community. 
A secondary problem within the status quo exists because of the history of the 
domestic intelligence enterprise within the United States. Domestic intelligence collection 
by police agencies is replete with examples of abuse, excess and illegal conduct by state, 
local and tribal law enforcement (Kaplan, 2006; Rafalko, 2011). The shift of law 
enforcement’s mission from criminal intelligence to domestic intelligence collection, and 
the proliferation of intelligence centers, state and local fusion centers and other public 
sector intelligence units in the post-9/11 environment has caused concern and is viewed 
by some as posing a “significant risk to domestic civil liberties unmatched since the red 
scares of the early 20th Century” (Kaplan, 2006).  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis posits the collection and sharing of classified national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, which is considered 
mission critical to achieving the overarching counterterrorism goal of preventing and 
mitigating future terrorist acts within the United States, is a public policy failure. A 
number of competing paradigms for the collection of domestic intelligence inside the 
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continental United States by state, local and tribal law enforcement exist. None of them 
addresses the collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence. 
State, local and tribal law enforcement agencies can make a significant 
contribution to the national classified intelligence collection effort. Current national 
policies on the collection and dissemination of classified national security intelligence, 
however, limit the amount and classification level of intelligence that can be shared with 
state, local and tribal law enforcement. Sharing of classified intelligence by members of 
the United States Intelligence Community requires a favorable determination of 
eligibility for access (vetting) by an agency head or the agency head’s designee; the 
signing of an approved nondisclosure agreement; and a need-to-know the information 
(Executive Order No. 13526, 2009). In addition, recent elimination of the “third party 
rule” 12  by Executive Order No. 13526, further complicates the release of classified 
intelligence to state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
United States Intelligence Community policies regarding dissemination of 
classified intelligence limit the effectiveness of state, local and tribal law enforcement as 
collectors of national security intelligence. Reasons for the reluctance to embrace state, 
local and tribal law enforcement as collectors of classified national security intelligence 
are wide and varied and include the real problem of the protection of human confidential 
source information—but often also hinge on the threat to civil liberties posed by a vibrant 
police intelligence function, and the desire to avoid creating an American-style “Gestapo” 
(Baker, 1994; Best, 2001).  
1. Primary Questions 
1. Can state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, utilizing the status 
quo, make a significant contribution to the classified national security intelligence 
collection effort?  
                                                 
12 The “third party rule” refers to restrictions on the subsequent release of classified information by 
recipients absent the consent of the originating agency. This rule was eliminated by Section 4.1 
(1)(2)(3)(i)(1) “Classified information originating in one agency may be disseminated to another agency or 
U.S. entity by any agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating 
agency, as long as the criteria for access under section 4.1(a) of this order are met.” 
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2. If not, what is the optimal policy option for implementation of a classified 
collection and sharing system by the United States Intelligence Community in 
collaboration with state local and tribal law enforcement? 
2. Secondary Question 
1. How does Great Britain address the collection and sharing of classified 
national security intelligence and can their model provide insight to the United States 
Intelligence Community and state, local and tribal law enforcement in the war on terror? 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes a research methodology that combines 1) a history/policy 
options analysis approach to identify issues, problems and 2) solutions surrounding the 
primary research questions regarding the collection of classified national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. This methodology 
consisted of two distinct components that collectively lead to a series of policy options 
and recommendations addressing the collection of classified national security intelligence 
and terrorism related information by state, local and tribal law enforcement. The ultimate 
goal of this research design is to formulate policy options that would lead to greater 
debate among the principal consumers of homeland security intelligence as to which of 
the four options creates the greatest amount of collaborative interaction between the 
federal government and state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The focus of this research is on the collection and sharing of classified national 
security intelligence by the Homeland Security Community, represented by state, local 
and tribal law enforcement agencies in partnership with the United States Intelligence 
Community. It is expected the findings of this research can influence policy makers as 
they search for policy models to improve the collection and sharing of classified national 
security intelligence. While a plethora of literature exists surrounding both the British and 
American versions of Intelligence-Led Policing, little of it has dealt with the issue of how 
state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies can best assist the United States 
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Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement in the collection and sharing of 
classified intelligence and the prevention of terrorism. 
Within the United States, the collection of classified domestic national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement requires clear and definitive policy 
models. This thesis identifies three alternate policy models in addition to the current 
Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
policy model that could enhance law enforcement’s contribution to counterterrorism 
efforts. This research will also contribute to the growing body of literature and 
knowledge of Intelligence-Led Policing as it is practiced in America. 
The proper role of the four policy options researched within this thesis is both a 
local law enforcement-policy issue and a domestic national security intelligence-policy 
issue. In the absence of a national strategy for the collection and sharing of domestic 
intelligence, defining the individual roles in the collection and sharing of national 
security intelligence in the war on terror is problematic. As the Department of Homeland 
Security, the United States Department of Justice, state, local and tribal law enforcement, 
and the overall United States Intelligence Community each strive to assert a leadership 
role in the prevention of terrorism within the United States, political considerations will 
continue to affect the efficient collection and sharing of classified domestic national 
security intelligence. Additional research into the effectiveness of Intelligence-Led 
Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative—and national 
strategies to guide its collection—is critical to the development of sound domestic 
national security policy. 
G. ARGUMENT:  MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE, AND 
CHALLENGES 
In the ever-changing post-911 enterprise, which is the United States Intelligence 
Community, the argument as to whether or not “cops should be spies” and significant 
contributors to the national security intelligence collection and sharing paradigm is 
increasingly at the forefront. As noted by the RAND Corporation: 
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Terrorism respects no boundaries. It is both a foreign and domestic matter, 
one that requires responses from both intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, among many other entities. One aspect of combating terrorism 
that is often discussed but seldom examined in detail is the overlap of 
intelligence and law enforcement and the role of state and local law 
enforcement agencies as the ultimate “eyes and ears” in the war on 
terrorism. (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005, Kindle location 11) 
A secondary argument regarding the empowerment of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies to aggressively pursue the infiltration, recruitment, disruption and 
the dismantlement of homegrown terrorist individuals and groups—in the manner of a 
bona fide member of the United States Intelligence Community—concerns the ability to 
conduct such investigations without compromising civil liberties. This is neither a new 
argument nor a new paradigm. It is, rather, a return to the problems confronting police 
domestic intelligence collection policies of the 1950s Red Scare era, the 1960s Vietnam 
War era and the 1970s Leftist Revolutionary era.  
The craft of domestic national security intelligence collection—as opposed to the 
collection of foreign national security intelligence13—is the least understood and most 
misrepresented of all of the various forms of national intelligence. Moreover, a lack of 
clarity regarding a doctrine that fails to define the craft of domestic intelligence 
collection—with a definition that is codified, comprehensive and universally 
recognized—severely complicates the development of national domestic intelligence 
guidelines governing the conduct of domestic intelligence collection. Defining 
intelligence collection adds specificity and consistency to an intelligence collection 
process where none had previously existed (Carter, 2004).  
To understand the extent of the problem regarding the collection and sharing of 
classified intelligence with state, local and tribal law enforcement, we must first attempt 
to define exactly what we mean by domestic intelligence. This is because the 
complexities of domestic national security intelligence collection within the homeland 
                                                 
13 An argument can be made that a majority of the intelligence collected in the United States by the 
United States Intelligence Community in the war on terror actually represents foreign intelligence regarding 
terrorist plots planned and directed from overseas (See Crumpton, 2005, p. 203). This thesis attempts to 
argue that even in those instances, the close cooperation of state and local law enforcement through 
classified intelligence sharing is critical to mitigating the threat from overseas. 
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have significant policy and civil rights implications depending on how domestic 
intelligence is defined and by whom, as well as how it is collected. The current lack of a 
definition of domestic intelligence instills confusion among the public and rank-and-file 
professionals whose duty it is to both collect pertinent intelligence and ensure the civil 
rights of those engaged in constitutionally protected activities.  
Where others have attempted to define domestic intelligence (Heck, 2009), the 
attempt has fallen short. If domestic national security intelligence is to follow the foreign 
collection model, with collection requirements derived from policy considerations, then 
the United States Intelligence Community needs to begin the process by defining the 
conditions requiring domestic national security intelligence collection and establishing 
rules and guidelines for the behavior of its collectors.  
Fundamentally, intelligence is “understanding the motivations, thoughts and plans 
of one’s enemies” (Cilluffo, Marks & Salmoiraghi, 2002, p. 61). Lowenthal (2009) 
defines intelligence as information subjected to analysis that is used to inform policy 
makers. What Lowenthal and Cilluffo et al. are referencing in their definitions of 
intelligence, however, is strategic foreign intelligence rather than tactical domestic 
intelligence. While strategic multi-disciplinary intelligence that provides “insights into 
the cultures and mindsets of terrorist organizations” (Cilluffo et al., 2002, p. 61) may be 
crucial to the greater United States Intelligence Community in providing warnings and 
indicators of impending attacks, it is of little tactical use to state, local and tribal law 
enforcement in preventing, preempting and disrupting terrorist activities before they 
occur.  
Strategic intelligence—when marketed to the state, local and tribal law 
enforcement community as a tactical intelligence product—often provides nothing more 
than unclassified background and context, often in a format that can be easily obtained 
through open sources. Strategic counterterrorism intelligence marketed to the state, local 
and tribal law enforcement community often takes the form of intelligence pornography, 
designed to satisfy the prurient intelligence interest of the reader, but which provide little 
of practical value for the prevention or mitigation of terrorism threats to the community.  
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In contrast, classic espionage is defined as a counterintelligence activity “directed 
towards the acquisition of information through clandestine means and proscribed by the 
laws of the country against which it is committed” (Cilluffo et al., 2002). Domestic 
intelligence collection by local law enforcement—except for its description as being 
illegal—most closely mirrors the definition of classic espionage; however, when targeted 
against domestic terror groups, domestic intelligence collection is more accurately 
described as counter-intelligence or counterterrorism rather than classic foreign 
intelligence collection or classic espionage.  
The issue surrounding which definition to embrace regarding the collection of 
classified domestic national security intelligence is further clouded when individuals or 
organizations use terms, such as domestic security, domestic tranquility, national security 
and internal security as a euphemism for the collection of domestic intelligence. The 
juxtaposition of criminal intelligence collection and analysis, such as intelligence-led 
policing, with domestic counterterrorism intelligence collection, as well as the differences 
between the mere gathering of information and the collection of actual intelligence causes 
further confusion. 
Henry A. Crumpton, former Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the 
Department of State, and the former Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
National Resources Division, has argued for a return to the fundamentals of the craft of 
intelligence and has called the heavy reliance on law enforcement as intelligence 
collectors a “traditional macro defensive effort” (2005, p. 198). Crumpton states, “The 
success of intelligence at home will increasingly depend on a new form of internal 
collection against specific enemies and on the forging of a deep partnership with the 
American nation, from local police forces to private enterprises” (p. 198).  
Both Crumpton and Fathali Moghaddam have postulated globalization as a meme 
that has created new opportunities for America’s enemies. Moghaddam, in particular, 
argued regular globalization encouraged us to accept a first worldview of al-Qa’ida as a 
multi-national terrorist organization following a corporation-like model. Moghaddam’s 
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fractured globalization, 14  however, teaches a second worldview of al-Qa’ida as a 
franchiser of terrorism. That terrorism is less a function of individuals or groups 
following al-Qa’ida’s lead and more the result of a conflict of culture between east and 
west. It is, for the franchisee, about social contract, trust, control and identity 
(Moghaddam, 2008, p. 45). From a political science standpoint, this argument is a further 
refinement of Alexander Wendt’s (1999) Theory of Social Constructivism applied to 
subgroups or franchises of al-Qa'ida. 
Crumpton, on the other hand argues, “…new enemies are individuals or teams 
armed with inconspicuous weapons, maneuvering secretly within the massive global 
exchange,” which from an intelligence perspective are “micro-targets,” who pose “macro 
threats” utilizing “micro sized, macro impact weapons.” Crumpton also cites “highly 
sophisticated intelligence services, even those of erstwhile allies” as significant domestic 
threats requiring a new approach to domestic national security intelligence collection 
(2005, p. 200). 
Crumpton cautions against the infringement of civil liberties during times of 
expanded military authority—as during the current post-9/11 enthusiasm for increased 
integration of foreign and domestic intelligence collection efforts—and the false sense of 
security that the “comfort of conventional defense provides” (2005, p. 203). Instead, 
Crumpton argues: 
[The] U.S. does not need a separate domestic intelligence structure for 
domestic suspects; this should remain the purview of U.S. law 
enforcement. Nevertheless, domestic-based foreign intelligence collection 
and analysis are critical to the constructing of the right defense. This 
domestic foreign intelligence structure, of course, can also enable 
offensive law enforcement initiatives in the homeland and U.S. responses 
abroad, ranging from diplomatic incentives to military strikes. (2005, p. 
203) 
What Crumpton argues for is an offensive foreign intelligence collection strategy, 
focusing on foreign intelligence collection in the homeland, which is more than the 
                                                 
14 Fractured Globalization is defined as “the tendency for sociocultural disintegration to pull in a local 
direction at the same time that macroeconomic and political systems are set up to pull toward the 
international direction and to accelerate globalization” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 8). 
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“detection and disruption of each individual threat” (911 Commission Report, p. 375). He 
feels U.S. Northern Command is poorly suited to address micro threats in this “new 
Domestic battleground” (p. 204). Instead, Crumpton states, “law enforcement—not 
military force or covert action—is statecraft’s hard-power tool in the homeland, and 
intelligence must support this customer” (p. 205). In other words, both the Department of 
Homeland Security and state, local and tribal law enforcement need a better offensive, 
classified national security intelligence collection and sharing policy model under which 
to operate. 
Research and precedent show that the United States has responded to the need for 
a classified domestic intelligence capability for state, local and tribal law enforcement in 
five ways: First, it has ignored it; Second, it has sought ad hoc arrangements, without 
clear authority or oversight, which has led to political abuse; Third, it has allowed 
domestic-based case officers of the Central Intelligence Agency to collect foreign 
intelligence through its National Resources Division; Fourth, the United States has rested 
on an assumption law enforcement can substitute for intelligence (Crumpton, 2005, pp. 
206–207); and Fifth, it has allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to bear the brunt 
of responsibility for the collection of classified domestic intelligence to counter both 
homegrown and transnational terrorism. The addition of the Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, as an independent collector of classified 
domestic intelligence, and its influence at the state, local and tribal area, has further 
muddied the manner in which the United States has responded to its need for classified 
domestic intelligence collection capability. 
As those working in the domestic intelligence collection arena correctly 
understand, the Central Intelligence Agency must collect their foreign intelligence in the 
United States overtly, not covertly and in close coordination with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, who under Executive Order No. 12333 (White House, 1981) have primary 
responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence15 within the United States. The 
                                                 
15 Foreign intelligence as defined by Executive Order 12333 includes the activities of hostile foreign 
intelligence services and transnational terrorism groups, as well as any information vital to the national 
security interests of the United States. 
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Department of Homeland Security has no such restrictions for the collection of domestic 
intelligence. Crumpton further failed to address the much broader category of U.S. 
Persons 16 against whom foreign intelligence can only be legally collected within the 
United States by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to the protections afforded 
by the United States Constitution.  
Do the “micro threats” referenced by Crumpton (2005, p. 198)—best exemplified 
by the Mumbai attack—require an entirely new form of internal intelligence collection 
efforts? If so, then the argument becomes:  Can the intelligence community and domestic 
law enforcement—to include the military—collect intelligence domestically without a 
new codified definition of domestic intelligence or national strategy? After all, classified 
domestic intelligence collection, including foreign intelligence collection, is not the same 
as internal or homeland security. Alternatively, an argument can be made that traditional 
law enforcement and public safety, with adjustments, can provide a reasonable level of 
both safety and the protection of civil rights. 
A secondary problem remains the question of who should be in charge of 
conducting the collection of classified domestic national security intelligence. If the 
McGaffin standard for the collection of intelligence, i.e., “by conscious, specifically 
targeted, operational clandestine espionage activity, whether technical, human, or a 
combination of both” (2003, p. 4) is used then, the primary expectation is that state, local 
and tribal law enforcement agencies will at some point be engaged in the clandestine 
recruitment of confidential human sources, whose mission will be to betray their 
compatriots, by stealing their secrets and selling—or giving them—to law enforcement. 
In which case, cops will have become spies…or at least, spy handlers. 
A major argument in support of the integration of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement into the United States Intelligence Community has been the desire to 
                                                 
16 A U. S. person is defined in Title 50, United States Code §1801 as “a citizen of the United States, an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of title 8), an 
unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or 
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United 
States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in 
subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.” 
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leverage the enormous information gathering capabilities of local law enforcement, 
which has thousands of agencies and almost 800,000 officers available throughout the 
United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Close coordination and control of the 
domestic intelligence gathering potential of local law enforcement, however, presents 
significant challenges for the United States Intelligence Community.  
The history of terrorist operations in the United States has shown terrorist groups 
can include both U.S. persons and foreign nationals, operating in and out of the United 
States and its territories, over long periods of time. For some scholars of multi-national 
terrorism, “the threat of catastrophic terrorism spans the globe, defying ready 
classification as solely foreign or domestic” (Carter, Deutch, & Zelikow, 1998, p. 82). 
The greatest danger arises when investigation of the threat—or the gathering of 
intelligence about the threat—falls through the cracks and into one of the “crevasses of 
overlapping jurisdictions” (p. 82), such as the divide between foreign and domestic 
terrorism, federal and state law enforcement, and national security versus homeland 
security. 
This historical problem significantly affects the intelligence community’s ability 
to address the terrorism problem, and this thesis’ ability to analyze and formulate a 
practical and positive policy option. The problem today is still as clear as articulated in 
1998 by the Universities Study Group on Catastrophic Terrorism: 
The law enforcement/national security divide is especially significant, 
carved deeply into the topography of American Government. The national 
security paradigm fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering. It 
anticipates the threat before it arises and plans preventive action against 
special targets. In contrast, the law enforcement paradigm fosters reactions 
to information provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trials 
governed by rules of evidence, and protects the rights of citizens. (Carter, 
Deutch & Zelikow, 1998, p. 82) 
The ability of state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies to collect, analyze 
and disseminate national security intelligence in the war on terror is critical to the 
capacity of the United States Intelligence Community to prevent terrorism. While 
Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiatives 
are considered successful models for the prevention of crime, neither works as effective 
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policy models for the collection of national security intelligence. As noted by the Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS): 
Local police departments play a critical role in the global war against 
terrorism. Intelligence professionals working in the IC [sic] know little 
about community policing procedures undertaken by local agencies, while 
local police departments often see the intelligence community as distant 
and unresponsive to their needs. (CHDS, 2009) 
Some experts, however, do not agree this is the problem. For them, a more salient 
problem within the classified/unclassified conundrum is that local crime issues only 
intersect with classified national security issues coincidentally (Wirtz, personal 
communication, 2010). While this may be true, it should not be the case that coincidence 
drives domestic intelligence collection policy. 
Returning to the de facto status quo, Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative are ineffective primarily due to police executives 
both failing to understand the purpose and limitations of both models as tools for the 
collection of national security intelligence. Little empirical evidence contained within 
either the literature or the law enforcement community suggests Intelligence-Led Policing 
and the Nationwide Suspicious Reporting Initiative are effective policy models for the 
collection of national security intelligence as opposed to merely criminal intelligence. 
Neither is there anecdotal evidence supporting the success rate of Intelligence-Led 
Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative in national security 
matters. In addition, the lack of local classified and unclassified national security 
collection requirements clearly inhibits state, local and tribal law enforcement’s ability to 
direct local national security collection efforts. 
To be effective as a domestic, national security intelligence collection system, 
Intelligence–Led Policing requires an integrated system of intelligence collection 
requirements tailored for the state, local and tribal law enforcement community and an 
agency to manage their dissemination. An effective policy model also requires access to 
classified national security intelligence, which suggests a means of systematically and 
efficiently granting classified clearances. Absent integration with the national intelligence 
community, Intelligence-Led Policing will always focus on local community concerns 
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and issues, and not on national security issues. State, local and tribal law enforcement 
have little hope of becoming a viable adjunct to the United States Intelligence 
Community until the efforts of police officers are directed towards the greatest threats in 
the collection of national security intelligence. 
The United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance and the 
Department of Homeland Security have each supported Intelligence-Led Policing and the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative without a clear understanding of 
their principles and their lack of policy doctrine, to the detriment of other possibly more 
viable intelligence collection policies and platforms. In supporting Intelligence-Led 
Policing as a means of collecting counterterrorism intelligence, the federal government is 
promoting not an intelligence collection process as the name might imply, but an 
“information-management process that allows police commanders to understand crime 
problems in a more strategic manner, and thus make more informed decisions to combat 
criminality” (Ratcliffe, 2008, p.188). 
The evaluation of the theories and practice regarding the collection of national 
security intelligence by domestic law enforcement and the paradigms they use is 
extremely important. The reason lies in the critical need to establish well-defined 
standards governing the operations of state, local and tribal law enforcement domestic 
intelligence units in the collection of national security intelligence. As Nestor Duarte 
postulated in his thesis Unleashing Our Untapped Domestic Collection is the Key to 
Prevention, “leaders must establish the priority for all law enforcement, from Agents and 
detectives, to cops on the beat, to view themselves as collectors of national security 
information” (Duarte, 2006, p. 66).  
The question regarding which policy model is most effective in the prevention of 
terrorist attacks in the homeland is the pertinent issue. Police executives argue, because 
of the overwhelming numerical superiority of local police agencies versus federal law 
enforcement, local law enforcement is best situated to uncover and address, i.e., prevent 
terrorism in the homeland (Major City Chief’s Association, 2008). Others argue 
nonfederal public sector intelligence units involved in domestic intelligence collection in 
the post-9/11 environment pose a significant risk to domestic civil liberties (Kaplan, 
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2006) and should not be involved in the collection of any noncriminal domestic 
intelligence. While the two arguments above represent the polar extremes regarding 
intelligence gathering, little disagreement exists that current domestic intelligence 
collection efforts “operate at the intersection of law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering” (Baker, 1994, p. 36) and represent a “blending of the roles between cops and 
spies” (Wittes, 1995). These two roles are desperately in need of analysis.  
Assuming a rationale for state, local and tribal law enforcement participation in 
the collection of domestic national security intelligence, unclassified collection 
requirements, which have synthesized national security intelligence into usable targeting 
assessments, remain an elusive goal. The incorporation of intelligence collection 
requirements from across the United States Intelligence Community to produce 
assessments that inform law enforcement, integrates intelligence functions and analysis, 
is critical to the success of any of the proposed policy options (National Counterterrorism 
Center, 2009). 
This important role would normally be assumed by the Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, who’s “mission is to equip the Homeland 
Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland 
safe, secure and resilient” (Department of Homeland Security, 2012). While the 
Department’s Homeland Security Standing Information Needs “form the foundation for 
information collection activities within the Department,” the failure to effectively 
mobilize the Department’s extensive domestic intelligence collection capability to fill the 
intelligence gap has left it without a recognized leadership role among its most obvious 
customers—state, local and tribal law enforcement—as well as other federal law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
Domestic terrorism usually involves only one host country so all protagonists, 
including the perpetrators, victims, financing and logistical support are homegrown 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). As a result, most law enforcement agencies17 consider purely 
                                                 
17 The New York and Los Angeles Police Departments are notable exceptions. See John Comiskey, 
Effective State, Local and Tribal Police Intelligence: The New York City Police Department's Intelligence 
Enterprise- a Smart Practice, 2010, for a more in depth discussion. 
 24 
domestic terrorists to be criminals for whom the normal range of criminal intelligence 
collection and modern law enforcement management methods are sufficiently effective to 
enforce the law and prevent terrorism (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2002; Major City Chief’s Association, 2008). Important to the understanding of domestic 
terrorism and its impact on the collection of classified national security intelligence, 
however, is many intelligence professionals previously believed domestic terrorism 
generated implications solely for the country of origin or its political interest. The attacks 
of 9/11, however, changed this perception. Subsequent domestic efforts by federal law 
enforcement and the intelligence community to ensure the prevention of terrorism within 
the United States have met with increased scrutiny from a dubious Congress. 
Prior to 9/11, terrorist attacks that included perpetrators, victims, targets, or 
interests from two or more countries constituted international or transnational terrorism 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Since 9/11, the intelligence community and federal law 
enforcement has seen a dramatic blending of domestic and transnational terrorism into 
something new and insidious. The modern-day threat from terrorism frequently falls 
between the seams of the military, intelligence and law enforcement. The prevention of 
terrorism requires the fusion of multiple elements of national power to collect intelligence 
and prevent future attacks (Grave de Peralta, 2010). 
Following the attacks on 9/11, “domestic law enforcement agencies, initiated, and 
in some cases enhanced efforts to gather intelligence against domestic terrorists” (CHDS, 
2007). Their efforts were diminished, however, by their lack of access to timely and 
accurate classified intelligence and national security collection requirements. In the 
words of the Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD) Commission:  “The intelligence 
failure in Iraq did not begin with faulty analysis. It began with a sweeping collection 
failure” (WMD Commission Report/Overview, 2005, p. 21). While the WMD 
Commission itself was referring to the failure of the intelligence community to collect 
pertinent classified national security intelligence, the same can be said about the current 
state of intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies across 
the nation. 
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The law enforcement community now faces a threat that receives its inspiration 
and direction from overseas groups, but may plan and implement its actions solely on the 
domestic front. These plots and groups have previously been identified and neutralized 
primarily through the development of classified signals intelligence, overseas electronic 
surveillance and the exploitation of evidence obtained through military missions in 
combat zones. Today, however, the threat may emanate from anywhere within the greater 
United States of America. 
Absent a unified national strategy for the collection of domestic intelligence, 
specific policy models for the collection of national security intelligence, as well as a 
system for the incorporation of collection requirements into the development of 
unclassified national security intelligence, “each agency will set out on its own to get 
what it needs” (Heyman, 2007 p. 155). In doing so, the nation risks a repeat of the 
disaster that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
H. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines public policy regarding the collection and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement; 
proposes policy models and examines the British system of domestic intelligence 
gathering. Chapter I poses the thesis questions, provides as examination of the status quo 
and summarizes the arguments in favor of the research. Chapter II summarizes the 
available literature on this topic and determined that only limited literature analyzing the 
overall validity of current procedures and policy models regarding state, local and tribal 
law enforcement collection of national security intelligence is available for review. 
Sufficiently abundant literature, however, does exist within the three main 
categories of research for this to provide a basis for the development of arguments in 
support of several different policy options to address the collection and sharing of 
national security intelligence. Chapter III discusses research design and methodology. 
Chapter IV presents the results and findings of the research. Chapter V synthesizes the 
findings from the previous four chapters, presents a preferred policy option for the 
collection of classified domestic national security intelligence by state, local and tribal 
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law enforcement. Finally, Chapter VI makes policy recommendations regarding the 
findings in Chapter V and for future intelligence related research. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This literature review explores questions surrounding the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of classified national security intelligence developed domestically by state, 
local and tribal law enforcement agencies. The literature reviewed is related to how 
intelligence collection, specifically national security intelligence, can better integrate 
state, local and tribal law enforcement with the overall United States Intelligence 
Community. This literature review also assesses if Intelligence-Led Policing, as a policy 
model enhances the collection of national security intelligence by state, local and tribal 
law enforcement. It compares Intelligence-Led Policing with the literature of other 
potential policy models and combinations of models, including the British Security 
Service (MI-5)18 Special Branch model,19 that are meant to enhance the ability of state, 
local and tribal law enforcement to identify, collect, process, analyze and disseminate 
critical national security intelligence. 
While sufficient literature exists regarding the question of both criminal and 
domestic intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement, only limited 
information exists about the specific questions regarding the collection and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement in 
support of counterterrorism, either in response to classified national security collection 
requirements, or through independent unclassified criminal collection, which is later 
classified based on its content and analysis. As noted by the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (2007): 
Although much has been written about how the threat of international 
terrorism creates challenges for federal law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, much less has been written about the nexus between local and 
state law enforcement officers, first responders and federal organizations, 
                                                 
18 The British Security Service (MI-5) is the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence component and 
is comparable to the National Security Branch of the FBI. 
19 The British Special Branch model involves close integration by the British Security Service of 
municipal police officers into classified national security investigations. The term Special Branch is used to 
identify individual police units responsible for national security matters under the supervision of MI-5. 
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especially in terms of intelligence collection. This is an important 
shortcoming in the existing literature on homeland defense and security. 
Local police departments play a critical role in the global war against terrorism 
and are often the first responders to the threats and results of domestic and transnational 
terrorism. Nevertheless, “a gap continues to exist today between the federal agencies that 
make up the national intelligence community and state and local police departments and 
intelligence organizations. The gap is not only organizational in nature but also involves 
practice and theory” (CHDS, 2007). 
Many excellent studies of individual categories of intelligence are available 
including counterintelligence (Kiernan, 2007), counterterrorism (Posner, 2007) and 
domestic intelligence (Burch, 2007; Dahl, 2011); some comparative studies of national 
security intelligence collection (Treverton, 2008; Masse 2006); and even studies of 
individual agencies (Zegart, 1999; 2007; Rafalko, 2010). Several intelligence anthologies 
address multiple issues, including operational and strategic considerations (Johnson & 
Wirtz, 2008, 2011), as well as collection and civil liberties in comparative government 
(Chalk & Rosenau, 2004); however, none provides a comprehensive assessment of 
domestic intelligence collection issues, nor do they provide an overarching theory of 
classified national security intelligence collection as it pertains to state, local and tribal 
law enforcement and homeland security. 
This literature review is divided into four main areas. First, it describes literature 
regarding the nature and general collection of national security intelligence, the 
intelligence collection and analysis cycle, criminal intelligence, intelligence tradecraft 
and national security law. Second, it highlights literature regarding Intelligence-Led 
Policing from British and American sources. Third, literature in which theories of 
domestic security intelligence and its application by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies is synthesized. Fourth, it surveys literature regarding domestic 
intelligence collection’s effect on civil rights and arguments for its restriction. 
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A. NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 
Much has been written that discusses the theory and practice of intelligence 
collection and analysis (see Lowenthal, 2008; Masse, 2003 and 2006; Posner, 2005, 2006 
and 2009; Treverton, 2008; Zegart, 1999 and 2007). As noted by Amy Zegart, however, 
national security intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement has 
been “vastly under studied in the discipline” (Zegart, 1999, p. 3). 
The National Security Act of 1947, as amended over the years, specifically 
authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to collect intelligence through human sources 
and other appropriate means, except the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no 
"police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security function" (National 
Security Act of 1947). The intention of the law was to hold intelligence separate and 
distinct from law enforcement activities. At the time the Act was written, concern existed 
about creating a monolithic central security service which history—and observations 
made of totalitarian states—had taught us was undesirable in a democratic society. 
Permissible intelligence collection activities were further clarified by President 
Reagan's 1981 Executive Order No. 12333 (1981). President Obama’s Executive Order 
No. 13526 (2009) amended Executive Order No. 12958 (1995) and Executive Order No. 
13292 (2003), issued by Presidents Clinton and Bush respectively, and deals with the 
manner in which sensitive information and classified national security intelligence is 
handled. The orders provide guidance to all intelligence agencies on the scope of 
allowable collection, classification procedures and other intelligence activities. Within 
the limits set out in Executive Order No. 12333, the intelligence community is permitted 
to collect a large amount of foreign intelligence that is of interest to law enforcement. 
Section l.4c authorizes the intelligence agencies to undertake the "collection of 
information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence 
activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international 
narcotics activities, and hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign 
powers, organizations, persons or their agents" (Executive Order No. 12333, 1981). Thus, 
Executive Order No. 12333 empowers the intelligence community to collect and analyze 
 30 
intelligence on the foreign aspects of traditional law enforcement concerns such as 
narcotics production and trafficking, international terrorism and counterintelligence, but 
not foreign intelligence. 
The definition of foreign intelligence has a long legislative history, tracing its 
roots back to its first iteration as part of the National Security Act of 1947; however, 
domestic intelligence and its collection are not addressed by the 1947 Act. As defined in 
the Act: 
(1) The term "intelligence" includes foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence. 
(2) The term "foreign intelligence" means information relating to the 
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities [emphasis added]. 
(3) The term "counterintelligence" means information gathered, and activities 
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, 
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities [Emphasis 
added]. (50 U.S.C. 401(a)). 
Nowhere does the National Security Act of 1947 refer to the term “national 
security” or “national security intelligence; rather it refers to “the intelligence required to 
address the national security interests of the United States as specified by the President.” 
(50 U.S.C. 402)(h)(2)(3)(A)). 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458), 
however, provides for a revised definition of national intelligence:   
The terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to national 
security” refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which 
derived and including information gathered within or outside the United 
States, that — (A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance 
issued by the President, to more than one United States Government 
agency; and (B) that involves — (i) threats to the United States, its people, 
property, or interests; (ii) the development, proliferation, or use of 
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weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter bearing on United 
States national or homeland security [emphasis added]. (p. 26) 
According to the above definition of national intelligence, all counterintelligence 
and counterterrorism intelligence collection activities, as well as the criminal intelligence 
gathering activities of state, local and tribal law enforcement, can be construed as 
contributing to the national or homeland security counterterrorism efforts to prevent 
sabotage and assassinations by foreign organizations, foreign persons and international 
terrorist activity (IRTPA, 2004). 
B. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Many excellent treatises regarding the history, development, application and 
evaluation of Intelligence-Led Policing exist, particularly in terms of the way 
Intelligence-Led Policing is applied within the British system of law enforcement. Many 
are on-point regarding the hypothesis contained in this proposal:  Intelligence-Led 
Policing does not work as a strategic or tactical policy model in the collection of national 
security intelligence for the prevention of terrorism. As Ratcliffe (2008) noted in 
Intelligence Led Policing: 
Intelligence-Led Policing is quite different from the meaning of 
intelligence common in military or national security context. Unlike in the 
military, law enforcement analysts are rarely a recognized feature of the 
managerial sphere, and across policing there is a lack of understanding of 
the role and applicability of crime intelligence to strategy. (p. 9) 
The term Intelligence-Led Policing, as a law enforcement model, originated in 
Great Britain in the early 1990s. Intelligence-Led Policing was considered a new 
approach to crime control that was “strategic, future-oriented and targeted” and “built 
around analysis and management of problems and risks, rather than reactive responses” 
(Maguire & John. 2006, pp. 67–85). 
Intelligence-Led Policing, community policing, criminal intelligence models and 
crime prevention strategies all share the same genesis as a managerial strategy for the 
prevention of crime and the apprehension of serial offenders (Ball, 2007; Carter 2004; 
Guidetti, 2006; Simeone, 2007). None, however, addresses the national security aspect of 
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collection by, for, or as a component of Intelligence-Led Policing. Rather, they assume 
national security intelligence can be collected incident to normal, aggressive policing 
driven by Intelligence-Led Policing (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2003). 
In the United States, the events of 9/11 prompted a review of all domestic 
intelligence sharing, which resulted in a reassessment of the value of Intelligence-Led 
Policing to the American policing establishment. The domestic intelligence divide in the 
United States, however, was incorrectly understood as an information-sharing problem 
rather than an intelligence collection problem. Assumptions and arguments contained in 
the 2003 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan suggest, “if greater information 
sharing had occurred prior to 9/11, the tragic events could have been prevented” 
(Ratcliffe, 2009, p. 32). 
While the literature notes that the lack of information sharing was a contributing 
factor in the failure to prevent the events of 9/11, nowhere is it argued that 
implementation of Intelligence-Led Policing prior to 9/11 would have had any substantial 
effect on subsequent events. The belief by the public that Intelligence-Led Policing might 
have had an effect on 9/11 can be attributed to American misunderstanding of 
Intelligence-Led Policing and why it was implemented in the United Kingdom. 
1. The British Intelligence-Led Policing System 
In 1995, the Kent Constabulary pioneered the first attempt to introduce 
Intelligence-Led Policing in a systematic manner into the day-to-day work of ordinary 
police officers. Intelligence became the core of local decision making, meaning the 
intelligence unit directed daily police activities, for example tasking patrol officers to 
gather specific information later used in planning operations (Maguire & John, 2006). 
The purpose of Intelligence-Led Policing was to reduce the reliance on calls for service to 
direct the deployment of police resources and return to a strategic planning process 
incorporating statistical analysis of crime trends to prevent crime rather than merely 
apprehend criminals.  
By 1997, the Inspectorate of Constabulary had published an influential report 
titled “Policing with Intelligence.” It documented the fundamental elements of 
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intelligence-led law enforcement and crime reduction, including an integrated 
intelligence structure, performance indicators and collaboration with outside agencies. 
“The report sought to indicate best practice to British police services (and by osmosis the 
broader law enforcement community) by drawing on an examination of the current 
application with six police forces (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 54). 
As the years progressed and policing in the United Kingdom continued to 
develop, “[a] gradual and piecemeal, but clearly perceptible, shift was taking place in 
police approaches to the investigation and control of crime” in England and Wales” and 
in many other countries:  
In essence, it was observed, rather than simply responding to individual 
crimes as they are reported by the public, the police—often in 
collaboration with other public sector agencies—were acting increasingly 
proactively in relation to perceived risks, putting substantial effort and 
resources into planned strategies to identify and to ‘target’ offenders, 
locations or activities that appeared to present a sufficient level of threat or 
nuisance to the community to merit priority attention. (Maguire & John, 
2006, p. 68) 
The paradigm shift in the “police approach[es] to the investigation and control of 
crime” ultimately led to a change in the manner in which both crime control and criminal 
intelligence collection were perceived, initiated and utilized by the international police 
community.  
a. The National Intelligence Model 
In 2000, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers in England and Wales sponsored, the National Intelligence Model, 
“a business model for law enforcement” (Maguire, 2000, p. 315). The National 
Intelligence Model identified the core business of policing as “managing crime, 
managing criminals, managing localized disorder, managing enforcement and community 
issues and reducing opportunities for crime. The desired outcomes of police work are 
“community safety,” “reduced crime,” “arrested/disrupted criminals,” “managed hot-
spots,” and “control of potentially dangerous offenders.” The police methods and 
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resources useful to achieve these outcomes included intelligence, reactive investigation, 
proactive operations and patrol resources (Maguire & John, 2006, p. 71). 
b. The National Policing Plan 
The British government’s first National Policing Plan, covering 2003–
2006, required all 43 police forces in England and Wales adopt the National Intelligence 
Model and to comply with its procedures by April 2004. In the United States, however, 
no such mandate exists, or can exist under the principles of federalism established within 
the 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution. National police governing bodies, 
such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s 
Association and the Major City Chief’s Association can make recommendations to their 
membership, but generally have little sway with their constituents, despite these 
organizations and the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance 
having universally adopted Intelligence-Led Policing and the National Suspicious 
Activities Reporting Initiative as their preferred policing and domestic intelligence 
collection model.  
2. The American Variation of Intelligence-Led Policing 
The closest approximation in the United States to the manner in which 
Intelligence-Led Policing is utilized in the United Kingdom is the New York Police 
Department and the Los Angeles Police Department’s use of CompStat, a computer-
based statistical analysis of crime data designed to drive deployment of limited police 
resources to combat serial crime (Ball, 2007). Both police departments derived their 
reliance on Intelligence-Led Policing from the leadership of William H. Bratton as Police 
Commissioner and Chief of Police respectively of each department. 
While the New York Police Department has been successful in promoting the 
popular view that the general reduction in major city crime in New York from 1993 to 
1998 was due to CompStat, a number of researchers have questioned this assumption 
(Ratcliffe, 2009). Controversy continues to this day regarding the manipulation of crime 
reporting statistics to give the appearance of policy success (Bruce, 2010; Patrick, 2012). 
If, however, CompStat represents the best application of the principles of Intelligence-
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Led Policing in the United States, there is no evidence that anything in the daily activities 
of the 9/11 hijackers would have brought them to the attention of local law enforcement 
applying these principles. 
An effective domestic national security collection system, Intelligence-Led 
Policing requires an integrated system of intelligence collection requirements tailored for 
the state, local and tribal law enforcement community. The key is the development of a 
system, which promotes significant “buy-in” regarding the collection of national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. Local police agencies have to both 
understand their role in national security and have a desire to participate in its collection.  
Absent a domestic, national security collection system that integrates unclassified 
intelligence requirements, local cleared intelligence liaison officers and a federal agency 
to develop and coordinate these efforts, state, local and tribal law enforcement has little 
hope of enhancing the collection efforts of police officers in regards to the greatest 
counterterrorism threats in the collection of national security intelligence. 
C. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE  
A significant category of intelligence literature deals with the synthesis of 
prevailing theories on domestic intelligence collection and reform, the historical 
perspectives regarding classified domestic national security intelligence collection and 
how intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement has impacted the 
enforcement of civil rights in the past. 
Gregory Treverton, noted scholar of intelligence issues, observed that in 
analyzing intelligence collection, a critical distinction existed between mysteries and 
puzzles. Treverton offered puzzles are questions with answers. Mysteries are those 
questions for which no answer exists. Puzzles involve facts and data. Mysteries involve 
judgment, analysis and interpretation (Treverton, 2007). In a quote from an article in 
Smithsonian Magazine derived from his book, Treverton states, “Solving puzzles is 
useful for detection. But framing mysteries is necessary for prevention” (Treverton, 2007, 
p. 2). The distinction is useful for this thesis because state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies are not usually in the business of framing mysteries, as United 
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States Intelligence Community collectors are often required to do. They much prefer the 
“Sgt. Joe Friday” approach to criminal investigation: “All we want are the facts ma’am” 
(Mikkelson & Mikkelson, 2008).  
If, however, state, local and tribal law enforcement is expected to be a major 
contributor to the prevention of terrorism within the United States, then the literature 
suggests that an understanding of the “framing of mysteries,” rather than just the solving 
of a puzzle, as most criminal investigators are trained to do, will be a requirement of their 
collection capacity. 
A systemic shortcoming with the academic literature surrounding the collection of 
national security intelligence is a prevailing lack of understanding regarding exactly how 
classified domestic national security intelligence collection within the United States is 
conducted from a practitioner’s point of view, as well as a doctrine on collection to guide 
law enforcement. Most literature ignores the very significant role that the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation has had since its inception in 1908 in the collection of domestic 
intelligence and foreign counterintelligence both within the United States and overseas. 
While many anthologies provide valuable examples of articles with divergent viewpoints, 
historical background and synthesis of national security and intelligence collection, few 
have synthesized the manner in which the various components of the United States 
Intelligence Community collaborate in the collection and dissemination of classified 
intelligence for domestic intelligence purposes. 
1. Defining Domestic Intelligence 
Former high-ranking members of the Central Intelligence Agency define domestic 
intelligence as “Domestic-based foreign intelligence collection and analysis critical to the 
constructing of the right defense” and “offensive foreign intelligence collection strategy, 
focusing on foreign intelligence collection in the homeland” (Crumpton, 2005, p.203). 
The distinction being the intelligence collected domestically is only legally related to the 
foreign, rather than the domestic threat. Any intelligence collected relating to the 
domestic threat is coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has 
exclusive jurisdiction for federal domestic intelligence collection (Rafalko, 2011).  
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The Department of Defense defines domestic intelligence as "intelligence relating 
to activities or conditions within the United States that threaten internal security and that 
might require the deployment of troops; and intelligence relating to the activities of 
individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the 
Department of Defense” (Joint Publication 1-02, p.171). Civil libertarians, on the other 
hand, have referred to domestic intelligence collection activities as the “secret collection 
of information by a government on its own citizens and residents” (Martin, 2004, p. 7). 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 includes neither a 
comprehensive definition of what constituted domestic intelligence (Masse, 2003 and 
2006, as cited in Treverton, 2008), nor an understanding of how domestic intelligence is 
distinguished from its associated subsets of homeland, internal and domestic security 
(Lowenthal, 2009). By contrast, the RAND Corporation defines domestic intelligence as 
“efforts by government organizations to gather, assess and act on information about 
individuals or organizations in the United States or U.S. [sic] persons elsewhere that is 
not necessarily related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific 
planned criminal activity” (Treverton, 2008, p. 15). 
The issue of how to define domestically collected national security intelligence 
becomes even less clear when individuals or organizations use terms like domestic 
security, domestic tranquility and national security, in place of, or as a euphemism for, 
the collection of domestic intelligence. More confusing yet is the juxtaposition of 
criminal intelligence functions with domestic intelligence collection functions for 
national security and the differences between the collection of information and the 
collection of intelligence. As illustrated below, former senior Central Intelligence Agency 
Associate Deputy Director of Operations John McGaffin made a clear distinction 
between gathering information and collecting intelligence during testimony before the 
9/11 Commission, a distinction that is not correct: 
While the FBI [sic] correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather 
evidence—and with it information, there is nonetheless a National 
Security imperative which distinguishes intelligence collection from a 
similar, but different, function found in Law enforcement. Gathering 
which is not driven or informed by specific, focused National Security 
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needs is not the same as intelligence collection as the DCI [sic] and the 
Intelligence Community understand the term. This collection is 
accomplished not incidental to law enforcement, but by conscious, 
specifically targeted, operational clandestine espionage activity, whether 
technical, human, or a combination of both. (McGaffin, Security and 
Liberty, p.4, as cited in Crumpton, 2005, p.209) 
As this quote illustrates, differences of opinion surrounding the complexities of 
defining domestic intelligence collection capabilities versus information collection within 
the homeland are significant. The misunderstanding and policy implications extend 
depending on who it is collecting domestic security intelligence, how it is collected and 
who is targeted. An additional concern is how the intelligence is recorded, maintained 
and disseminated. 
a. Problems Associated with the Collection of Domestic Intelligence 
The collection of all national security intelligence in the United States is 
based upon the principles embodied in the intelligence cycle, i.e., intelligence 
requirements inform collection and analysis. The national intelligence collection 
requirements that drive the cycle are developed, based on input from policy makers, the 
collective United States Intelligence Community and promulgated by the Director of 
National Intelligence. It is these collection requirements that serve as the foundation for 
the United States Intelligence Community collection of national security intelligence, 
whether related to terrorism, counterintelligence, or positive foreign intelligence 
(Lowenthal, 2008).  
Following the tragedy of September 11, the demand for both foreign and 
domestic intelligence became a national priority. Despite the well-meaning collective 
efforts of members of the intelligence community, the need to have universal rules for the 
collection, analysis, maintenance, dissemination and purging of intelligence information 
quickly became apparent. Domestically, only the Law enforcement Intelligence Unit, a 
national criminal intelligence organization, has promulgated the use of standardized 
investigative conduct guidelines, primarily those contained in Code of Federal 
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Regulations, Title 28, Part 23.20 These guidelines have long been in use in local and state 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, these guidelines govern the conduct of criminal intelligence 
and are not generally transferable to the collection of classified domestic national security 
intelligence. 
According to Crumpton (2005), the United States Intelligence Community 
has historically responded to the need for a domestic foreign intelligence capability in 
four ways: First, it has ignored it. Second, it has sought ad hoc arrangements with state, 
local and tribal law enforcement, without clear authority or oversight, which has led to 
political abuse. Third, it has allowed Central Intelligence Agency case officers to collect 
foreign intelligence domestically though its National Resources Division. Fourth, it has 
rested on an assumption that law enforcement efforts alone can substitute for intelligence 
collection  
Problems associated with the collection and maintenance of intelligence 
information on United States Persons reflect the general absence of national domestic 
intelligence guidelines governing the collection and sharing of both classified and 
unclassified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. The 
primary purpose of national domestic intelligence collection guidelines would be to avoid 
unnecessarily broad invasions of citizens' privacy without legitimate, noncriminal law 
enforcement or intelligence purpose, or the creation of intelligence files without existence 
of a documented intelligence predicate. 
b. Domestic Intelligence Doctrine 
No one has proposed an overarching theory or doctrine regarding the 
domestic collection of national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement (Zegart, 2007). Some have explored the issue regarding the establishment of 
a new domestic intelligence agency (Treverton, 2007; Burch, 2007). Former Federal 
                                                 
20 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 is a guideline for law enforcement agencies. It contains 
implementing standards for operating federally grant-funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence 
systems. 28 CFR Part 23 does not provide specific, detailed information on how the standards should be 
implemented by the operating agency but, instead, provides the ability for each agency to develop its own 
policies and procedures. 
 40 
Bureau of Investigation Deputy Assistant Director Brenda Heck (2009) did propose 
consolidation of federal law enforcement and intelligence functions into one mega-
community “given the agility, speed and complexity of twenty-first century threats” (p. 
14). 
According to Heck, “To counter globalized threats, the national security 
system must be as connected, interdependent and networked” (p. 22). Ultimately Heck 
proposes “Define[ing] national security, domestic security, domestic intelligence, law 
enforcement and homeland security for the twenty-first century in a new security doctrine 
to create a common language and understanding of these critical security terms” (p. 83). 
Her recommendations regarding the development of a new security doctrine, however, 
fall short of actually creating an overarching theory applicable to the collection of 
domestic national security intelligence.  
Defining domestic intelligence doctrine is complicated by the addition of a 
new subset of intelligence—Homeland Security Intelligence—that also remains 
undefined by statute or general acceptance (Lowenthal, 2009). As Masse observed, “The 
terms domestic intelligence and homeland security intelligence are often used 
colloquially and interchangeably by some observers” (2006, p. 3). In the field of 
homeland security, as many different definitions of domestic intelligence exist as 
intelligence agencies. 
Rather than attempting to articulate a vision of how her theory regarding 
doctrine could be achieved, Heck appears to defer to the expertise and leadership of the 
United States Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement as a whole. Heck’s 
proposal ignores the significant role that domestic state, local and tribal law enforcement 
could play in any new security doctrine and instead assumes a federal leadership role in 
addressing new intelligence paradigms involving the global war on terror. In Heck’s 
defense, articulating the specific components of a new national security or doctrine 
strategy was beyond the scope of her thesis.  
Intelligence authorities, including former Central Intelligence Agency 
officers Crumpton and McGaffin, who have written from a practitioner’s standpoint, 
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often take a myopic, agency-centric view of domestic information gathering, implying 
state, local and tribal law enforcement have little or no relevant role in the collection of 
national security intelligence (Sims & Gerber, 2008) due to a lack of domestic 
intelligence collection requirements. 
Other literature comes closer to providing an objective view of domestic 
intelligence collection within the United States from a historical perspective, as against 
the Germans during WWII (MacDonnell, 1995). Central Intelligence Agency case officer 
Frank Rafalko (2011) documents an interesting counter-narrative to the conventional 
revisionist view of domestic intelligence collection as inherently illegal and in violation 
of civil rights law. In his study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s efforts to investigate 
foreign intelligence service infiltration of the Black Panther and the radical new left 
movement, Rafalko outlines in great detail how domestic intelligence collection during 
the 1970s was closely coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
United States Department of Justice in order to prevent violations of federal law and civil 
rights abuses. Rafalko’s narrative suggests, however, that domestic intelligence collection 
designed to detect foreign intelligence service penetration of domestic movements is 
largely only within the capability and purview of federal agencies like the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Perhaps because their focus is on counterintelligence from a national 
security perspective, some literature suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the role of 
state, local and tribal law enforcement in the collection of classified domestic national 
security intelligence (Sims & Gerber, 2009). In the case of Transforming Intelligence, 
each author within the anthology provided a different contextual application of the term 
counterintelligence, leading to confusion on the part of the reader as to its actual 
meaning. Dr. Kathleen L. Kiernan provides insight into the law enforcement intelligence 
paradigm, but falls short, as she seems to confound the terms counterintelligence and 
counterterrorism (Kiernan, 2009). 
Richard Posner’s study of domestic intelligence reform provides a cogent, 
lucid narrative on the nature of domestic intelligence with which to frame the problem of 
its collection (Posner, 2005, 2006, and 2007). Posner understands “the most serious of the 
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neglected system-wide problems, however, is that of domestic intelligence” (Posner, 
2007, p. xi) and argues for a separate purely domestic intelligence agency outside of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Citing Congressional testimony by Richard Falkenrath, 
Posner “underscores the importance of an effective domestic counterterrorism and 
intelligence program” in countering “the rise of the homegrown terrorist threat” (p. 147). 
Nevertheless, while his arguments for a separate federal domestic 
intelligence agency have considerable scholarly merit, Posner does not explain how 
domestic intelligence is—or should be—collected by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement. Posner and others presume that the collection of domestic intelligence, 
particularly national security domestic intelligence, would be conducted “by dedicated 
investigators with both intimate knowledge of the population in question and mastery of 
human intelligence tradecraft who are backed by the full power and resources of a major 
law enforcement agency” (p. 148). This argument by a sitting federal judge ignores 
precedent involving both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the 10th Amendment 
establishing the principle of Federalism. The collection of classified domestic national 
security intelligence is not just an urban problem, but one also faced in rural America. 
D. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
A significant piece of the public policy literature involving the collection of 
classified national security intelligence within the homeland involves its impact on civil 
liberties. Scholars have frequently noted that, “By its very nature, domestic and homeland 
security intelligence is intrusive and risks infringing on civil liberties” (Dahl, 2011). The 
historical literature of the domestic intelligence enterprise within the United States is also 
replete with examples in the literature of abuse, excess and illegal conduct by federal, 
state and local agencies, including U.S. military intelligence units (Rockefeller 
Commission Report, 1975; Church Committee Report, 1976; IC21, Staff Study, 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HR 104, 1996; Kaplan, 2006).  
More recently Dahl (2011), writing in the journal Homeland Security Affairs 
noted:  
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Some domestic counterintelligence activities of the Department of 
Defense have drawn criticism since 9/11, in particular the now-defunct 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). But in general, military and 
other national security intelligence capabilities have not been utilized 
domestically to any great degree, because of civil liberties concerns as 
well as Posse Comitatus restrictions on the use of military personnel for 
law enforcement. 
James Burch (2007), as well, recognized that “an increased focus on domestic 
intelligence leads to concerns about civil liberties and oversight” (cited in Johnson & 
Wirtz, 2011, p. 500) and appropriately noted that “letting an organization pursue an 
aggressive domestic intelligence agenda could lead to the domestic spying abuses similar 
to those of the 1950s and 1960s” (p. 501). 
After 9/11, government organizations reorganized around the counterterrorism 
and homeland security missions while police intelligence resources shifted from the 
investigation of criminal enterprises to the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks 
(Masse, O’Neil & Rollins, 2007). Because of this shift of missions from criminal 
intelligence to domestic intelligence collection, recent literature has implied that the 
proliferation of law enforcement intelligence centers, state and local fusion centers and 
other public sector intelligence units in the post-9/11 environment can also pose a 
significant risk to domestic civil liberties (Kaplan, 2006). 
While the current state of police and military intelligence unit activity has not 
replicated the most egregious abuses of the past century, a review of the literature 
revealed two important themes in regards to domestic intelligence collection, as it is 
practiced in America today. First, no comprehensive national guidelines governing the 
conduct of domestic intelligence collection efforts within the United States and its 
territories exist. All current guidelines are voluntary in nature, except for those 
promulgated by the Attorney General mandated for use by the United States Department 
of Justice. Second, neither a comprehensive definition of what constitutes domestic 
intelligence (Masse, 2003 and 2006, as cited in Treverton, 2008) nor an understanding of 
how domestic intelligence is distinguished from its associated subsets of homeland, 
internal and domestic security (Lowenthal, 2008) can be said to exist. Rather, the 
definition of domestic intelligence depends upon the author's frame of reference. For 
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example, foreign intelligence collected internationally might be referred to as domestic 
intelligence if its primary affect was significant to the homeland.  
Current domestic intelligence collection literature strongly suggests, as Stuart 
Baker stated in 1994, a “hidden struggle” continues to occur between federal, state, local 
police and other investigative agencies which “operate at the intersection of law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering” (Baker, 1994, p. 36). The literature implies this 
is due to the absence of a codified definition of domestic intelligence. Defining 
intelligence collection adds specificity and consistency to an intelligence collection 
process where none previously existed (Carter, 2004).  
Disconnection and misunderstanding among agencies of the objectives of 
domestic intelligence collection suggests potential for abuse of power. While no 
professional organization is without individuals who may abuse their authority, historical 
literature has shown that the answer to such errors is not the abolition of law enforcement 
intelligence files and domestic intelligence units. Rather, the suggested solution lies in the 
establishment of well-defined standards governing the operations of domestic intelligence 
units. 
The essential question regarding the protection of civil liberties and the collection 
of intelligence within the homeland remains, “if spies shouldn’t be cops, should cops be 
spies?” If domestic intelligence is to follow the foreign collection model with collection 
requirements emanating from policy issues, then the literature regarding domestic 
intelligence failures suggests the process needs to begin by defining the condition and 
establishing rules for its behavior. 
Absent national standards for the collection of domestic intelligence and without a 
framework and clarity about roles and responsibilities, “each agency will set out on its 
own to get what it needs” (Heyman, 2007, p. 155). In doing so, the nation risks a repeat 
of historical police and intelligence agency abuses of the 20th century.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Defining domestic national security intelligence collection requires a fundamental 
understanding of the elements of collection management and national intelligence 
requirements. For domestic national security intelligence, the literature revealed both a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the domestic intelligence collection cycle by state, 
local and tribal law enforcement, and a lack of nationally established domestic 
intelligence collection requirements that reflect the national security requirements of the 
United States as established by the Director of National Intelligence.  
There exist few studies that analyze the overall validity of current procedures and 
policy models regarding state, local and tribal law enforcement collection of national 
security intelligence. This lack of theory and analysis when it comes to intelligence 
collection is an area in need of study (Zegart, 1999) and is, as the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (2007) observed, “an important shortcoming in the existing 
literature on homeland defense and security.” 
This literature review suggests, however, that there is an abundant literature 
within the four main categories of research for this thesis—national security intelligence, 
Intelligence-Led Policing, domestic intelligence and civil liberties and intelligence 
collection. This material can provide a basis for the development of arguments in support 
of several different policy options to address the collection and sharing of domestic 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis utilizes a combination historical study and policy analysis to identify 
issues, problems and solutions surrounding the collection of national security intelligence 
by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, both independently and in 
conjunction with the United States Intelligence Community. Using the historical 
perspective through an on-going literature review to compare the collection of criminal 
intelligence in the prevention of crime with the collection of national security intelligence 
by state, local and tribal law enforcement in the prevention of terrorism—both in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom—this thesis develops an assessment of the 
status quo, as well as identifying policy alternatives for the manner in which national 
security intelligence is collected—or not collected—by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies within the United States. The thesis methodology will also frame 
questions for future national security policy analysis and research. 
The history of policy implementation regarding Intelligence-Led Policing in the 
United Kingdom and the United States is important to the understanding of why the 
Intelligence-Led Policing policy model, the recommended information sharing and 
intelligence policy model for the collection of criminal intelligence by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002; Bureau of 
Justice Administration, 2005; Carter, 2008), may or may not work in the United States 
for the collection of national security intelligence. 
According to David Carter, “the conceptual foundation of ILP [sic] provided by 
BJA [sic] was articulated as building on the lessons of problem-oriented policing and 
CompStat, applying these principles to a threat-based environment of multijurisdictional 
complex criminality” (Carter, D. L. & Carter, J. G., 2013, p. 78, cited in Archbold, C. A., 
2013). Without an understanding of the historical perspective governing the development 
and implementation of the Intelligence-Led Policing paradigm in the United Kingdom, 
the various collection and sharing methodologies cannot be assessed as potential policy 
options for state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies within the United States. 
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The same issues regarding the use of this research methodology hold true for the 
analysis of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. While greater in 
collection scope than intelligence led policing, the suspicious activity reporting initiative 
has been framed as another answer to local police intelligence collection issues. By 
looking at both implementation and policy implications surrounding the suspicious 
activity reporting initiative, this thesis hopes to create a basis for the establishment of a 
unified classified intelligence collection policy. 
A. THE EIGHTFOLD PATH 
This thesis utilizes the “Eightfold Path,” popularized by Eugene Bardach (2009) 
at the Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, as the basis 
of its policy option analysis. Each step of the path will be incorporated into this combined 
methodology. The eightfold path consists of the following steps. Step one involves 
definition of the problem to be analyzed. In this thesis, the primary issue examined is the 
ability of both state, local and tribal law enforcement and the United States Intelligence 
Community to collect and share with each other classified counterterrorism intelligence 
that is collected pursuant to a set of classified intelligence collection requirements. 
Step Two involves assembling evidence or analysis. According to Bardach, the 
purpose of assembling evidence is “to assess the nature and extent of the problem(s) you 
are trying to define. A second purpose is to assess the particular features of the concrete 
policy situation” (p. 10). The most important point regarding the assembly of evidence, 
however, is to determine and “assess policies that have been thought, by at least some 
people, to have worked effectively in situations similar to your own” (Bardach, p. 11). 
Both British and American law enforcement have policies in place regarding the 
collection of criminal, and in some cases, national security intelligence, by state, local 
and tribal law enforcement. These policies are assessed for their applicability to the 
collection of national security intelligence in support of the counterterrorism mission of 
the United States Intelligence Community. 
Step Three involves the identification of policy alternatives. In conducting policy 
options analysis, the range of principal alternatives can sometimes be daunting. Such is 
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the case when looking at the range of possibilities for the collection of national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. All of the potential alternatives are 
governed by the federal government’s need to protect intelligence sources and methods; 
therefore, some of the most logical alternatives—such as simply providing universal 
access to classified intelligence to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies—
cannot easily be implemented. Viable alternatives must be constructed that meet the 
security requirements of the United States Intelligence Community, and yet conform to 
national security law. 
Step Four involves the selection of criteria used to select among competing 
alternatives. Policy analysis has “two interconnected but separable plotlines, the 
analytical and the evaluative.” This thesis is primarily evaluative and attempts to project 
outcomes that “will solve the policy problem to an acceptable degree” (Bardach, p. 26). 
The principal objective of this thesis is to determine from a policy standpoint the optimal 
method for state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies to incorporate the collection 
of national security intelligence into their normal range of law enforcement activities. 
Step Five involves developing an estimate of the possible outcomes that will 
follow in the wake of various policy options. Projecting the outcomes of possible policies 
is the most difficult step in policy options analysis. In addition to utilizing a systematic 
effort to project the outcomes, this thesis utilizes an outcomes matrix to visualize policy 
alternatives. The principle purpose of a policy analysis matrix is “to provide information 
and assist policy makers” (Pearson, Gotsch & Bahri, 2003, p. 17) in deciding the best 
outcome among various policy options. Policy analysis matrices are based on a “well-
understood framework” in order for “decision makers and interest groups to understand 
the consequences of policy actions” (Pearson et al., 2003, p. 7). 
For purposes of this thesis, the well-understood framework consists of four 
possible primary policy outcomes:  1. Can the policy model increase the collection of 
classified national security intelligence pursuant to classified intelligence collection 
requirements? 2. Can the policy model increase the sharing of classified national security 
intelligence? 3. Does the policy model respond to classified intelligence collection 
requirements? 4. Is the policy model universally adoptable by state, local and tribal law 
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enforcement? Two secondary outcomes were also examined:  1. Will the policy model 
improve intelligence tradecraft by state, local and tribal law enforcement? And 2., Will 
the policy model address concerns for the protection of civil rights? 
Step Six involves an assessment of the value trade-offs involved in various policy 
options. Because one dominant policy alternative to the problem associated with the 
collection of national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement does 
not exist, this thesis proposes a range of alternatives to the outcomes for assessment. 
Step Seven involves making a policy recommendation. In this step, three policy 
options, plus the status quo initially described in Chapter I of this thesis, i.e., the 
Intelligence-Led Policing and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
model, an expanded Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Terrorism Task Force model, 
a National Counter-Terrorism Center/National Fusion Center model and a model 
patterned after the British “Special Branch” system, are parsed into a final series of 
recommendations. A discussion of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis is also offered inasmuch as the Department continues to 
promote itself as a viable alternative for classified domestic intelligence collection by 
state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
Step Eight culminates in the final chapter of this thesis as the “story of whether or 
not cops should be spies,” along with the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
regarding the collection of national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement. 
B. RESEARCH LIMITATION 
This research is limited in several ways. First, the research methodology does not 
include the use or analysis of classified materials. It will attempt to analyze the process 
by which classified intelligence, including controlled unclassified information, is 
collected by members of the United States Intelligence Community and shared 
domestically with state, local and tribal law enforcement. This research will also attempt 
to formulate a policy by which classified and controlled unclassified 
information/intelligence can be collected and shared between domestic police agencies. 
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All research into the collection of classified domestic national security 
intelligence can be quite problematic because “any open-source, academic study of 
intelligence matters is of course limited by the exclusion of classified materials” (Dahl, 
2004 p. 2–3). This study is no exception to this general observation. By utilizing a 
methodology that attempts to address inherent disadvantages regarding the lack of access 
to classified materials by only considering options that deal with the implementation of a 
classified collection policy, however, the need to access classified materials is mitigated. 
Excluding the use of classified intelligence examples in this thesis affects the 
degree to which the policy models being proposed for the collection of national security 
intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement can be critically evaluated, thereby 
somewhat limiting the outcomes. As many classified counterterrorism criminal cases are 
readied for trial within the United States, however, examples involving classified 
information that has been declassified are now available in the public domain for scrutiny 
and scholarly research. They will be utilized where needed to highlight the effects of 
limitations on sharing. 
C. GENERALIZABILITY 
Generalizability is a form of reasoning predicated on a common occurrence that is 
used to predict similar occurrences in the future (Barnes et al., 2005, cited in Chen, 
2009). The outcomes projected for this thesis are speculative in nature in that they remain 
untested. As with any analysis addressing public policy, particularly public policy 
involving national security, the ability to generalize beyond the specifics of each policy 
option is difficult, at best. Therefore, the confidence level in each policy option proposed 
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IV. RESULTS 
This thesis evaluated three questions surrounding the collection and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. First, 
can state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, utilizing the status quo, make a 
significant contribution to the classified national security intelligence collection effort?  
Second, what is the optimal policy model for the collection of classified domestic 
national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies to be 
used in the prevention of terrorism? Finally, how do Great Britain and the British 
Intelligence Community address the collection of classified domestic national security 
intelligence, and can their model provide insight to the United States Intelligence 
Community and state, local and tribal law enforcement in the war on terror? 
Four different policy options were examined utilizing a policy options analysis 
methodology. The four options analyzed were, the Intelligence-Led Policing and 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative model (the Status Quo); the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force model; the National Counterterrorism 
Center/National Fusion Center model; and, the British Special Branch model. Each 
policy option has its own set of positive and negative outcomes, and each requires 
enabling legislation or executive orders to achieve the goal of integrating state, local and 
tribal law enforcement into the collection and sharing of classified national security 
intelligence in support of counterterrorism efforts within the United States. 
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS 
This thesis determined the ability of state, local and tribal law enforcement to 
collect, analyze and share classified national security intelligence, pursuant to classified 
intelligence requirements, with members of the United States Intelligence Community is 
critical to the prevention and mitigation of international terrorism threats within the 
United States (Cilluffo, Clark, & Downing, 2011).  
The involvement of state, local and tribal law enforcement in the collection and 
sharing of classified national security intelligence in support of national counterterrorism 
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efforts augments the ability of federal law enforcement and the United States Intelligence 
Community to provide for an enhanced state of homeland security through the leveraged 
sharing of intelligence, and “is crucial to protecting the United States from another 
terrorist attack” (Federal support for and involvement in state and local fusion centers, 
2012). Current restrictions on the sharing of classified national security intelligence with 
state, local and tribal law enforcement outside of Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces and their Executive Committees, however, negatively impact the 
intelligence community’s ability to leverage law enforcement strengths and mitigate 
terrorism threats within the homeland (Downing, 2007).  
No unequivocal answer was provided for which of the four policy models would 
provide for optimal enhancement of law enforcement’s ability to collaborate on the 
collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence; however, a preference 
for an American adaptation of the British Special Branch option was clearly indicated in 
the policy options matrix. Details supporting this finding are described in the policy 
options sections of this thesis. 
1. Classified National Security Intelligence Collection 
Classified intelligence—particularly domestic intelligence relevant to the 
homeland that is collected and shared by the military, other government agencies and 
friendly foreign intelligence services—is considered the apex of information relevant to 
the investigation and mitigation of terrorism threats. Proper collection of classified 
domestic counterterrorism intelligence “requires the fusion of…elements of national 
power to prevent attacks, collect vital intelligence, and facilitate the use of key evidence 
to achieve substantive convictions” (Grave de Peralta, 2010, p. v). The unfettered sharing 
of classified national security intelligence among members of the United States 
Intelligence Community is fundamental to mitigating the terrorism threat at the federal 
level (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). 
Misconceptions and disagreement among the various state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies charged with collecting domestic counterterrorism intelligence has 
created a fundamental disconnect between the United States Intelligence Community and 
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domestic police agencies. As noted by David Carter in Law Enforcement Intelligence:  A 
Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement: 
At the outset, law enforcement officers must understand the concept of 
law enforcement intelligence, its distinction from national security 
intelligence, and the potential problems an SLTLE [sic] agency can face 
when the two types of intelligence overlap. A law enforcement executive 
must understand what is meant by an “intelligence function” and how that 
function can be fulfilled through the use of different organizational 
models. Related executive decisions focus on staffing, particularly when 
there are fiscal limitations. Complicating this mission are two new 
intelligence responsibilities that have emerged:  1. Information sharing 
with national security and homeland security partners as part of the 
Information Sharing Environment and 2. Developing a capacity for 
Homeland Security—or “all-hazards”—Intelligence. (Carter, 2004, p. 3) 
United States intelligence policy models currently restrict the sharing of classified 
intelligence with all but the largest police agencies across the country that have forged 
separate personal and professional relationships with members of the United States 
Intelligence Community and acquired the appropriate clearances. As Frank Cilluffo et al. 
noted, “Nearly a decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, there continue to be 
gaps in the types of intelligence products to which local law enforcement has access” 
(Cilluffo, Clark, & Downing, 2011). Restricting access by smaller state, local and tribal 
law enforcement to classified intelligence places them at a significant disadvantage and 
inflicts an undue burden upon the thousands of law enforcement organizations 
responsible for the first-line, physical protection of the general populace. 
a. Access to Classified Intelligence 
Reasons for the marginalization of state, local and tribal law enforcement 
from access to classified intelligence by the United States Intelligence Community are 
many and varied. They range from legal restrictions (executive orders, legislation, 
national security directives) to operational considerations requiring the protection of 
sensitive sources and collection methods. This problem has been exacerbated by state, 
local and tribal law enforcement insistence on running independent intelligence collection 
operations that are in conflict with United States Intelligence Community tactical and 
strategic goals and objectives (AP's Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations, 2013). 
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Under the preferred policy option, classified intelligence collection 
operations would be subject to mandatory United States Intelligence Community 
oversight under the leadership and direction of the Director of National Intelligence. In 
order to participate in the collection and sharing of domestic national security intelligence 
and concomitant counterterrorism targeting information, a domestic law enforcement 
agency participating in the program would have to agree to the oversight encompassed in 
the Department of Justice’s Domestic Intelligence Investigations Guide. 
The problem regarding the granting of classified security clearances, 
however, remains the difficulty, or at times inability of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement to obtain Secret or Top Secret clearances, and is often cited as a reason for 
restricting access to classified materials (Chen, 2009). Problems associated with the 
potential leaking of classified material to the media or watchdog groups are also 
frequently cited (FBI statistical data on leaks of classified intelligence Information, 
2010). 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, limiting access to 
classified information and intelligence is the only proven method of protecting sensitive 
sources and methods (FBI statistical data on leaks of classified intelligence Information, 
2010). In recognition of this finding, the United States Intelligence Community has 
unilaterally determined that state, local and tribal law enforcement have no need-to-know 
the majority of classified intelligence available regarding terrorists threats to the 
homeland. Access to classified national security intelligence is therefore denied to a great 
majority of police officials within the domestic law enforcement, homeland security 
community.  
Public source research into both the deliberate and inadvertent disclosure 
of sensitive methods of intelligence collection and singular sources of intelligence 
suggests the majority of these disclosures come from within the already established 
intelligence community (Hoekstra, 2005). This makes the restricting the granting of 
additional clearances and access to classified intelligence due to fear of leaking a “straw 
man” argument. The fact of these disclosures is also irrelevant to the question of whether 
or not state, local and tribal law enforcement should be given vetted access to classified 
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intelligence. A more pertinent question is the significance of a real need-to-know21 for 
nonspecific, classified strategic intelligence by local law enforcement. 
The lack of a nationally directed vetting process providing for the conduct 
of background investigations and the granting of security clearances to nonmembers of 
the intelligence community exacerbates the difficulty for state, local and tribal law 
enforcement to obtain security clearances. This remains a significant counterterrorism 
intelligence issue. The lack of a directed vetting process also effectively limits state, local 
and tribal law enforcement’s ability to investigate—and thereby mitigate—terrorism 
threats. This in turn allows the United States Intelligence Community to make the 
inability to obtain proper clearances and fear of disclosure an easy excuse for the denial 
of access to classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement. 
The ability of state, local and tribal law enforcement to utilize classified 
intelligence to run human intelligence networks, signals intelligence collection platforms 
and electronic surveillance targeting a suspected terrorist facility is critical to mitigating 
the terrorist threat. Absent access to classified national security intelligence, state, local 
and tribal law enforcement lack the information, background and context with which to 
understand the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to their communities, and thereby 
properly deploy their limited resources.  
Without broader access to classified tactical targeting intelligence and 
classified intelligence collection requirements state, local and tribal law enforcement’s 
potential contributions to the United States Intelligence Community will continue to be 
marginalized in the domestic aspect of the war on terror.22 
                                                 
21 Need-to-know is defined by DoD 5200.2-R as “A determination made by a possessor of classified 
information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, 
knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to perform tasks or services essential to the 
fulfillment of an official United States Government program” (Need-to-know -- defense security service, 
2012). 
22 While state and major urban fusion centers have access to classified strategic intelligence through 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence and Analysis Division—and through the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s assigned Field Intelligence Group representative—it is classified domestic 
tactical and targeting intelligence, along with classified intelligence collection requirements that is 
frequently not shared with state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
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2. Findings Regarding the Status Quo 
This thesis further finds that the status quo, i.e., the Intelligence-Led Policing and 
Nationwide Suspicious Reporting Initiative are not the optimal public policy models for 
the collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement agencies. This second finding suggests a significant need exists 
for a new policy option designed to fully integrate state, local and tribal law enforcement 
into the classified national security intelligence-collection paradigm and entry into the 
larger United States Intelligence Community. Absent access to appropriate security 
clearances and the requisite training to ensure compliance with security directives, 
intelligence tradecraft and policies regarding the handling of classified intelligence, state, 
local and tribal law enforcement will almost never be provided access to sensitive 
intelligence, sources and methods or entrusted with their protection. As a result, they will 
be unable to make a significant contribution to the classified national security intelligence 
collection effort utilizing the status quo. 
Political realities suggest that any policy option that proposes unfettered access to 
classified intelligence by cleared state, local and tribal law enforcement, not under the 
direct supervision of a member of the United States Intelligence Community, may be 
impractical and politically untenable. The sheer number of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies within the United States makes certification of local intelligence 
officers a difficult task. Even if restricted to only the 70 largest police and sheriffs 
departments comprising the Major City Chiefs and Sheriffs Association, the task is 
daunting considering the widely varying political spectrum that the state, local and tribal 
law enforcement community represents. 
Intelligence agencies by their inherent nature are disinclined to recognize and 
participate in the responsibility-to-share doctrine, as opposed to the need-to-know where 
the lives of collectors, confidential human sources and multi-billion dollar SIGINT 
platforms are on the line. As noted by Richard Best: 
At the heart of the intelligence effort lies [sic] a paradox. The necessary 
goal is to find the best balance between adequate sharing and effective 
information security. Intelligence is valuable only if it can be share with 
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those who need it, but, to the extent that it is more widely shared, risks of 
compromise are enhanced. (Best, 2011, p. 1) 
The mere ability to access the closed classified computer systems required to 
share classified intelligence frequently require secure compartmented intelligence 
facilities, classified document storage safes and technically secured computer lines—
something that is well beyond the financial ability of all but the largest of the major 
metropolitan police departments. These types of facilities can be built, and if the United 
States Government is committed to the integration of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement into the United States Intelligence Community, it needs to bear a significant 
portion of the cost of implementation of this policy option. 
An easier and more politically expedient policy option involves simply increasing 
federal funding for the major city chiefs and sheriffs associations, sufficient that each 
could hire additional personnel in order to become a full-time participant in a regional 
Joint Terrorism Task Force. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to suggest an 
intelligence community solution to the problem of classified domestic intelligence 
collection and sharing—as opposed to a budgetary solution—that would in all likelihood 
prove temporary. 
The single most-critical issue for the domestic homeland security community 
since the attacks on September 11 has been how to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
United States. This issue is dominated by two relevant questions. The first is how does 
the United States Intelligence Community ensure federal, state, local and tribal law 
enforcement have the authority to collect, use and share critical classified national 
security intelligence about potential terrorist activities? The second is how does the 
homeland security community ensure that this authority is not abused? (Richman, 2004).  
The following are four policy options and their analysis. The analysis is designed 
to examine potential practical solutions to the national security intelligence-sharing 
conundrum. A range of solutions is proposed. While lacking the intimate details that 
make actual policy analysis politically viable, the programs examined and the proposal 
presented are intended to serve as a starting discussion point for a new domestic 
intelligence paradigm as we enter the second decade of the post-9/11 intelligence era. 
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B. POLICY ANALYSIS 
1. Option One—The Status Quo 
a. The Intelligence-Led Policing Model  
The development of an integrated Intelligence-Led Policing policy model 
incorporating the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is the de facto 
status quo for the collection and sharing of criminal intelligence by state, local and tribal 
law enforcement agencies. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major 
City Chief’s Association, the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan all endorse Intelligence-Led Policing (Peterson, 2005). 
Numerous nationally recognized law enforcement agencies—such as the Los Angeles 
Police Department and the New York City Police Department—as well as with the 
United States Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security also 
endorse the Intelligence-Led Policing and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative as the preferred police intelligence sharing policy model (Carter, 2008). 
In the mid-nineties, law enforcement officials across the nation—and 
indeed the world—began to realize a need to incorporate more intelligence analysis, 
primarily criminal intelligence analysis, into the conduct of their daily duties. The 
movement became known as Intelligence-Led Policing (Maguire & John, 2006). 
Introduced by the Kent Constabulary in 1984, Intelligence-Led Policing provoked 
considerable change in the way police executives and criminologists viewed the 
preventive role of policing (Maguire & John, 2006). Within the United States, Chief 
William Bratton led the drive towards Intelligence-Led Policing, when he was Chief of 
the New York City Transit District Police (Ratcliffe, 2008). Intelligence-Led Policing has 
been adopted by a significant number of state, local and tribal law enforcement and is 
aggressively marketed to the policing community by the United States Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (Peterson, 2005).  
b. Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting (SAR) Initiative 
Intelligence–Led Policing and the homeland security community have also 
embraced the Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative as its basic method 
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of collection for unclassified law enforcement intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious 
Activities Reporting Initiative “has been endorsed by the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the National Sheriffs' Association, 
the Major County Sheriffs' Association and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 
Council” (Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), 2012). The premise of the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative is that to prevent terrorism and not just respond 
to its after-effects, police must focus on “precursor conduct—surveillance or “casing” of 
bridges or train stations, for instance—that may not be criminal, but may signal a coming 
attack” (Farmer, 2010, p. 1). 
Utilizing an unclassified version of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
classified Guardian tracking system—known as e-Guardian—the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting model combines local law enforcement’s suspicious activity reporting 
with state and local fusion center analysis to provide information and potential 
intelligence to the United States Intelligence Community through e-Guardian (Rogero, 
2010): 
e-Guardian is a secure, but unclassified, user-friendly enhancement to the 
classified Guardian Program. e-Guardian was implemented to share 
potential terrorist threats, terrorist events, and suspicious activity 
information among state, local tribal and federal law enforcement partners, 
in conjunction with state fusion centers, regional intelligence centers, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. e-
Guardian bridges the gap between the secret-level Guardian system on 
internal Federal Bureau of Investigation networks, and the Sensitive But 
Unclassified law enforcement environment, via the Internet’s Law 
Enforcement Online system for state, local and tribal law enforcement 
agencies. (Rogero, 2010) 
e-Guardian allows recognized law enforcement agencies to record 
suspicious activity or threat information with a potential nexus to terrorism in a 
standardized format, using a predefined business process flow and to submit the 
information for review and analysis at the local agency, regional or state fusion center, as 
well as to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. e-Guardian is the only intelligence sharing 
system that processes unclassified potential terrorist threats, events and suspicious 
activity information—as opposed to classified intelligence—and has the potential to share 
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information among federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, state fusion 
centers and Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (Rogero, 
2010): 
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is the outgrowth 
of a number of separate but related activities that respond directly to the 
mandate to establish a “unified process for reporting, tracking, and 
accessing suspicious incident reports and suspicious activity reports” as 
called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. (White House, 
2007, p. A1-7) 
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is a 
comprehensive effort involving federal, state, local and tribal authorities to build upon 
existing capabilities and establish a unified, nationwide process for sharing of terrorism-
related suspicious activities reports. As described in the NSI [sic] Technical 
Implementation Options, Version 1 (March, 2010): 
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a 
collaborative effort among federal and state, local and tribal (SLT) 
government agencies with Counterterrorism (CT) responsibilities. 
Developed pursuant to Presidential direction, it establishes a nationwide 
capability to gather, document, process, analyze, and share information 
about suspicious incidents to enable rapid identification and mitigation of 
potential terrorist threats. 
The resulting NSI business process (often referred to as the NSI cycle) 
was described by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing 
Environment (PM-ISE) in a Concept of Operations for the NSI published 
in December 2008 and in a revised functional standard in May 2009. (p. 1) 
c. Problems with the Status Quo Policy Option 
Analysis of Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative policy option determined—despite it being the de facto 
status quo for the collection of unclassified criminal intelligence—that it is an ineffective 
policy model for the collection of classified national security intelligence by state, local 
and tribal law enforcement. Moreover, some have argued from a civil liberties point of 
view “Suspicious Activity Reporting begins at the troubled intersection where law 
enforcement meets intelligence” (Farmer, 2010, p. 1).  
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While the Department of Homeland Security has attempted to market the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative under the banner of  “See Something 
Say Something,” there is little empirical evidence that the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative has resulted in any proactive terrorism preventions. The 
historical evidence suggests that the lack of classified intelligence collection and 
classified intelligence sharing has resulted in a number of missed prevention 
opportunities. The cases involving Najibullah Zazi, 23  Faisal Shahzad, Nidal Malik 
Hassan and others are primary examples of the flaws in the suspicious activity-reporting 
concept. In none of the cited cases was suspicious activity reported to authorities prior to 
the attempted terrorist events (Federal support for and involvement in state and local 
fusion centers, 2012). 
The integrated Intelligence-Led Policing and Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting policy model does not endorse or encourage the collection of 
classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. Rather 
it demurs, arguing instead that the universal implementation of Intelligence-Led Policing 
and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement will automatically result in an increase in general nonclassified criminal 
intelligence collection. The implication being that an increase in the collection of general, 
nonclassified criminal intelligence will result in a concomitant increase in classified 
national security intelligence and that a decrease in terrorism will occur by default 
(Peterson, 2005). 
Where Intelligence-Led Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative fail as classified national security collection strategies and policy 
models is in the general misunderstanding by state, local and tribal law enforcement of 
the programs’ primary purpose. Rather than being appreciated as an excellent crime 
prevention policy models and data-processing management tools, Intelligence-Led 
Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative are viewed as 
                                                 
23 The Najibullah Zazi case is particularly relevant, in that the initial information regarding Zazi was 
developed through classified sources and methods and was not shared with the New York Police 
Department until investigation showed that New York City was his primary target. 
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intelligence panaceas, not only by state, local and tribal law enforcement, but also by 
Department of Homeland Security officials who do not seem to understand local 
domestic intelligence collection and the potential negative impact domestic intelligence 
policies have on local police agencies’ ability to enforce the law. It is sometimes easy to 
forget that when it comes to the collection of domestic intelligence “the ability of the 
police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions” (Peel, 
cited in Lentz & Chaires, 2007). 
Heyman and Carafano (2008), on the other hand, appropriately note “State 
and local law enforcement are the ‘first preventers’” and that to identify and thwart crime 
state, local and tribal law enforcement need accurate information. In an effort to connect 
too many dots, however, state, local and tribal law enforcement are often the recipients of 
“multiple uncoordinated information products” (p.15). Misapplication of the term 
intelligence is generally argued as the reason underlying the misunderstanding of 
Intelligence-Led Policing. 
A secondary problem with Intelligence-Led Policing is the many different 
interpretations, in both concept and application, by different law enforcement agencies. A 
primary criticism of Intelligence-Led Policing remains that “there is a movement toward 
the adoption of Intelligence-Led Policing without a universally accepted definition or a 
manual of practice" (Carter, 2008, p. 41). According to Carter, no Manual of Practice for 
Intelligence-Led Policing exists because, “like community policing, it must be tailored to 
the characteristics of each individual agency” [emphasis added]. Carter defines 
Intelligence-Led Policing as: 
…an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of 
a law enforcement organization. Rather than being simply an information 
clearinghouse that has been appended to the organization, Intelligence-Led 
Policing provides strategic integration of intelligence into the overall 
mission of the organization. (Carter, 2004, p. 41) 
d. Defining Intelligence for Homeland Security 
A concomitant problem affecting the validity of the Intelligence-Led 
Policing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative policy model as a 
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classified collection platform occurs due to the misuse and conflation of the terms law 
enforcement intelligence and criminal intelligence, which are often used synonymously, 
but frequently defined differently, by state, local and tribal law enforcement (Privacy 
impact assessment for the department of homeland security state, local, and regional 
fusion center initiative, 2008). The most commonly used police definition of intelligence 
originates with the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which defines criminal 
intelligence as “information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to 
anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity” (IACP Criminal Intelligence Model 
Policy, 2003, cited by Peterson, 2005, p. 39). 
The Bureau of Justice Affairs within the Department of Justice, on the 
other hand, has stated simply “information plus analysis equals intelligence” (Peterson, 
2005, p. 3). Understanding the distinction between information and intelligence, as well 
as between criminal intelligence and national security intelligence is important because 
most Americans think of the term law enforcement intelligence as a concept distinct from 
the term national security intelligence. The United States Department of Justice, for 
example, defines criminal intelligence information as:  
…data which has been evaluated to determine that it is relevant to the 
identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who 
or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal 
activity; and meets criminal intelligence system submission criteria. 
(Privacy impact assessment, 2008) 
As the general intelligence literature makes clear, intelligence is an 
analytic process. To render the information gathered useful, information must be 
analyzed, as analysis is the “derivation of meaning from data” (Privacy impact 
assessment, 2008). Analysis can be tactical and operational, or it can be strategic, and the 
resulting intelligence can be tactical or strategic. Tactical intelligence allows law 
enforcement to solve a particular crime, while strategic intelligence provides the big 
picture. However: 
Distinct from criminal intelligence, national security intelligence is the 
collection and analysis of information concerning the United States, its 
relationship with foreign governments and nonstate actors, regarding 
political and economic factors, and the maintenance of sovereign US 
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principles. National security intelligence is focused more on the security 
of the Nation and the conduct of foreign affairs. It is not focused on the 
prosecution and conviction of individuals [emphasis added]. The risk in 
the collection of classified national security intelligence is that it may not 
be amenable to use in a criminal proceeding, rendering its use 
questionable as direct evidence in a criminal prosecution. Second, the 
sources and methods used to gather the information that is the basis of the 
national security intelligence might be compromised if used in a criminal 
proceeding. (Privacy impact assessment, 2008, p. 7–8) 
In the United States, the events of 9/11 prompted a review of all domestic 
intelligence sharing, which resulted in a reassessment of the value of Intelligence-Led 
Policing to the American policing establishment. The domestic intelligence divide in the 
United States, however, was incorrectly understood as an information-sharing problem 
rather than an intelligence-collection problem. Assumptions and arguments contained in 
the 2003 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan suggest, “if greater information 
sharing had occurred prior to 9/11, the tragic events could have been prevented” 
(Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 32). There is significant question among intelligence professionals 
whether this assumption is, in fact, true. 
This argument assumes the collection of intelligence prior to 9/11 was 
adequate to render a conclusion regarding the intent and operational plans of the 
hijackers. No such a priori conclusion exists in the unclassified literature. Rather, what is 
clear from the literature is “the system had detected a raft of indication that a major attack 
was imminent weeks before it happened” (Betts, 2008, Kindle location 1322) but was 
unable to determine “when, where, or how an assault might come” (Kindle location 
1339) due to a lack of tactical intelligence.  
Critics of the United States Intelligence Community’s intelligence 
collection efforts prior to 9/11 continue to assert proper intelligence collection can 
somehow be reduced to “a stochastic exercise in which the probability of some event can 
be determined with a degree of certainty” (Wirtz, 2003, p. 105). Clearly, this is not the 
case.  
Rather than just collecting more dots—which in effect just adds more 
“noise to the system” (Handel, 2003, cited in Betts & Mahnken, 2003, Kindle location 
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401)—and makes the data collected more difficult to analyze—the intelligence 
community, including state, local and tribal law enforcement, has to collect the correct 
relevant information. The most relevant counterterrorism information generally resides 
domestically within the classified intelligence traffic.  
While the lack of information sharing was certainly a contributing factor 
in the failure to prevent the events of 9/11, it is a fallacy to believe implementation of 
Intelligence-Led Policing prior to 9/11—as construed by American law enforcement—
would have had any effect on subsequent events. This paradox was a direct result of 
American misunderstanding of how and why Intelligence-Led Policing was initially 
implemented and employed in the United Kingdom. 
In order for a positive outcome regarding the collection of classified 
national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement to be achieved 
through implementation of Policy Option One, a national policing plan on order of that 
implemented by the British government, along with a National Intelligence Model 
(Guidance on the national intelligence model, 2005)  backed by Congressional legislation 
is required. As previously noted, however, significant Constitutional and political 
impediments exists to the passage of this type of national legislation. 
To be an effective domestic national security collection system, 
Intelligence-Led Policing requires an integrated system of intelligence collection 
requirements tailored for the state, local and tribal law enforcement community. The key 
is the development of a system that promotes significant “buy-in” regarding the 
collection of classified national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law 
enforcement. Local police agencies have to both understand their role in the collection of 
classified national security intelligence and have the desire to participate in its collection. 
Absent a domestic, national security collection system that integrates 
classified intelligence requirements, local cleared intelligence officers and a federal 




enforcement has little hope of enhancing and efficiently directing the collection efforts of 
police officers towards the greatest threats in the collection of national security 
intelligence, classified or otherwise. 
For many communities, particularly those whose political base consists of 
progressive-minded individuals grounded in the anti-establishment politics of the 1960s 
and 1970s, this is a difficult decision. Any intelligence policy model involving the 
collection of noncriminal political intelligence by local police agencies is the antithesis of 
their political raison d'être. 
e. Civil Liberties Issues 
Civil liberty groups—represented in part by individuals like former FBI 
Special Agent Mike German, security policy counsel for the American Civil Liberties 
Union—take issue with the Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative, 
arguing “it increases the probability innocent people will be stopped by police and have 
their personal information collected” (German, cited by Farmer, 2010, p. 1). According to 
German, programs like the Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative “moves 
the police officer away from his core function, to enforce the law, into being an 
intelligence officer gathering information about people” (German, 2010, p. 1). 
Janet Napolitano, the secretary of Homeland Security, has stated it is her 
belief that, “homeland security begins with hometown security” (Napolitano, 2010). The 
question, however, is can locally based observations of suspicious activity occur without 
also encouraging a disregard for privacy and constitutional rights?  “The difference here 
is one of degrees” (Farmer, 2010, p. 1). 
2. Option Two  
a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Terrorism Task 
Force Model 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Joint Terrorism Task Force 
policy model examines the proposed development of an enhanced Joint Terrorism Task 
Force that would incorporate greater numbers of state, local and tribal law enforcement 
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agencies into counterterrorism and intelligence operations. The Joint Terrorism Task 
Force is at the heart of the current policy model for the domestic collection of classified 
national security intelligence by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in partnership with 
state, local and tribal law enforcement. This model, however, does not address the 
sharing of classified intelligence regarding counterterrorism matters except with those 
members of local law enforcement assigned to the task force. 
Each Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force consists 
of a multi-agency legal partnership led by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation that effectively and efficiently maximizes investigative 
collaboration in the global war on terror (The department of justice's terrorism task 
forces, 2005). The first Joint Terrorism Task Force was initiated in 1980 in the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s New York City Field Office. Prior to 9/11, there were 32 Joint 
terrorism Task Forces in all of the major urban areas. In the 11 years since the 9/11 
attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has added task forces to all 52-field offices, 
bringing the total to 71 Joint Terrorism Task Forces created since the events of 9/11 
(Downing & Mayer, 2012). Many of the larger field offices operate more that one Joint 
Terrorism Task Force. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Seattle Field 
Office, which is responsible for the entire state of Washington, maintains two Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces and two additional annexes throughout the state. The Department 
of Justice lists a total of 103 Joint Terrorism Task Forces as of 2005 (The department of 
justice's terrorism task forces, 2005). 
All Joint Terrorism Task Forces include federal agents—primarily the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Defense law enforcement component agencies—as well as state, local and sometimes 
tribal law enforcement agencies. Full-time participants in a Joint Terrorism Task Force 
hold Top Secret and in some cases sensitive compartmented information or special access 
clearances. The security clearances for all state, local and tribal law enforcement assigned 
to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are sponsored and maintained by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (The department of justice's terrorism task forces, 2005). 
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b. Regional Intelligence Groups 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces are now enhanced by the creation of Regional 
Intelligence Groups by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to oversee and coordinate 
individual Field Office, Field Intelligence Group analysis within eight regions. Regional 
Intelligence Groups differ from the Joint Regional Intelligence Centers established in Los 
Angeles, Washington D.C. and Chicago to coordinate state and local intelligence fusion 
in that the Regional Intelligence Group’s primary responsibility is the supervision of the 
analytical product produced by the Field Intelligence Groups assigned as part of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The difference between 
federal Regional Intelligence Groups and local Joint Regional Intelligence Centers is an 
important distinction for purposes of this policy option. In addition, each Special Agent-
in-Charge of a Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Office is now considered the 
Director of National Intelligence’s field representative, usurping the traditional role of the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s Station Chief of their National Resources local offices 
(FBI gets a broader role in coordinating domestic intelligence activities, 2012). 
Within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary 
responsibility for the investigation and mitigation of all domestic and international 
terrorism threats to the homeland (Executive Order 12333, 1976; IRTPA, 2004). All of 
the Joint Terrorism Task Forces operate under the direct supervision of the interagency 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Counterterrorism Division (The department of justice's terrorism task forces, 2005) and 
serve as a critical force-multiplier for both intelligence collection and the law 
enforcement application of the homeland security paradigm. The Joint Regional 
Intelligence Groups operate under the direct supervision of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Intelligence Division. 
c. Advantages of the Joint Terrorism Task Force Model 
The strength of an enhanced Joint Terrorism Task Force policy option 
would be the ability to collect and share classified national security intelligence among a 
larger number of state local and tribal participants, and the 16 members of the United 
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States Intelligence Community. Joint Terrorism Task Force members are privy to some 
of the most sensitive investigations and investigative techniques used within the United 
States Intelligence Community, although normal rules regarding need-to-know apply. 
Counterterrorism cases are frequently worked jointly, with local agency participants often 
taking the lead and classified intelligence freely exchanged among members of the Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces.  
While participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces by state, local and 
tribal law-enforcement routinely fluctuates, enhanced participation would provide a 
mechanism for the sharing of classified intelligence with state, local and tribal law 
enforcement executive management through the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive 
Board. The chief executive of each outside agency participating in the Joint Terrorism 
Task Force sits as a member of the Executive Board for which the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation routinely provides Secret and Top Secret clearances. The level of clearance 
provided is generally dependent on the agency head’s level of participation, severity of 
the local threat and need-to-know, with the highest levels of security clearances provided 
on a case-by-case basis.  
According to RAND, the Joint Terrorism Task Force represents "close to 
the ideal division of labor" (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005, Kindle location 
108). Because state, local and tribal law enforcement frequently have neither the funding 
or the capacity to engage in pure intelligence collection, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation takes the lead and assumes responsibility for all counterterrorism 
intelligence collection not connected to criminal activity, while state, local and tribal law 
enforcement provide the local-area expertise. A side benefit of this symbiotic relationship 
is all intelligence gathered by state, local and tribal law enforcement is "guided by federal 
regulations and overseen by federal courts" (Kindle location 108) rather than by local 
privacy acts, freedom of information acts and legislation designed to limit the amount of 
intelligence collection that can be conducted by state, local and tribal law enforcement. 
Local agency participation serves as a significant adjunct to, and force 
multiplier for, the local Joint Terrorism Task Force. The greater the local participation in 
the task force, the more likely local elected executive management will have confidence 
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critical counterterrorism information is being shared at the local level. This is because 
local officers are encouraged to brief their own local police management on salient 
counterterrorism issues when their agency management participates in the Executive 
Board and maintains the requisite security clearance.  
d. Problems with the Joint Terrorism Task Force Policy Option 
Two principle problems occur with the enhanced Joint Terrorism Task 
Force policy model: First, how do you increase participation in the Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces when state, local and tribal governments are already suffering from diminishing 
budgetary resources? Second, how do you overcome the perception that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation is only half a partner—or alternatively the dominant majority 
partner—unwilling to share classified intelligence even with their task force agency 
partners, or through their local and state fusion centers? This perception of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation extends nationally to the Department of Homeland Security and 
the greater United States Intelligence Community as well (Downing, 2007). Some of the 
largest police departments in the country, including the Los Angeles Police Department, 
believe little or no integration of intelligence between federal and local law enforcement 
exists. As noted by Los Angeles Police Department Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing, 
Commander of Counterterrorism Intelligence and Special Operations, during an interview 
with senior national security correspondent for the Washington Times, Bill Gertz: 
I think to say that we have an integrated federal intelligence system is 
false. We have a centralized federal intelligence enterprise, and we’re not 
taking advantage of the decentralized law enforcement structure that we 
have in the United States. (Downing, as quoted by Gertz, 2011) 
Chief Downing is not alone in his viewpoint. Another perceived problem 
with the Joint Terrorism Task Force model concerned the ability by elected state and 
local officials to receive and review classified information involving their jurisdictions 
and law enforcement personnel. According to Yi-Ru Chen (2009), the majority of 




other chief executives and “were emphatic of their desire to receive classified 
information” (p. 30). These respondents believed the “receipt of classified information 
meant a higher level of detail:” 
Responses revealed that even when they received such information, they 
have been unimpressed with the level of detail considered classified. The 
majority of respondents suggested that the lack of useful information in 
classified material was the result of the lack of collaboration or 
information sharing from the federal intelligence community with their 
fusion centers. The majority of respondents also noted anecdotally that the 
Top Secret classification of information made it impossible for those that 
have Secret level clearance to receive the intelligence. The majority of 
respondents also indicated concern with the federal control of access to 
intelligence, which suggested the federal effort did not support the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (White House, 2007, p. 30). 
This finding by Chen is indicative of one of the central problems regarding 
participation in a Joint Terrorism Task Force and the use or broad dissemination of 
classified intelligence to individuals unfamiliar or un-indoctrinated into the world of 
classified intelligence. Individuals who work outside of the classified environment have 
unrealistic and elevated expectations of what classified intelligence can provide. In most 
cases no higher level of detail exists between Secret and Top Secret information, only a 
greater level of confidence and greater sensitivity to compromise based on the 
identification of the access level of the sources and methods that provided the 
intelligence. 
This is not to presume the intelligence community lacks confidence in the 
lower level intelligence; each requires the same level of prevention from disclosure. 
However, lower level intelligence will often delete references to the specific sources and 
methods requiring protection from disclosure, as opposed to Top Secret intelligence, 
which will often detail the sources and methods to improve the confidence level of the 
intelligence. It is the often-inadvertent disclosure of sensitive source and method 
information by state and local officials unschooled in collection methodology that is 
central to the problem. 
Evidence of discord over the sharing of classified intelligence with elected 
state, local and tribal officials came to a head in 2005, when the City of Portland, Oregon 
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recused itself from membership in the Portland’s Joint Terrorism Task Force over the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s refusal to grant the Portland mayor a Top Secret 
security clearance. Portland thereafter expressed a concern that intelligence assessments 
and investigations unrelated to a criminal nexus were being conducted in violation of 
local ordinances. A perception soon developed by Portland’s political leadership that 
those counterterrorism investigations involved significant civil rights violations of 
Portland citizens (Meyer & Findanque, 2012). 
Perhaps the more salient problem involves the lack of greater participation 
in Federal Bureau of Investigation run Joint Terrorism Task Forces by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement. Anecdotal evidence revealed participation by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement in Joint Terrorism Task Forces was frequently limited due to 
funding issues. 24  The inability of local police chiefs to use Urban Areas Security 
Initiative grant funds to staff their participation on a Joint Terrorism Task Force and the 
reluctance of local governments to dedicate limited budgetary revenue streams to support 
what they perceive as a federal responsibility (counterterrorism) is often cited as 
justification for their nonparticipation in joint task forces. Despite the obvious significant 
value added by colocating state and local officers with federal agents, current Department 
of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management funding regulations continue 
to disallow the hiring or paying of additional officers in support of counterterrorism 
participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces despite the obvious significant value added 
by colocating state and local officers with federal agents and national clandestine service 
intelligence officers (Scharf, personal communication, 2007). 
In contrast, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center in the Los Angeles, 
California claims to include “representatives from seven counties with a total of 18 
million people and 166 police agencies” (Gertz, 2011). A distinction needs to be made,  
 
                                                 
24 The FBI Seattle, Puget Sound Joint Terrorism Task Force is a primary example. Of the FBI Special 
Agents and 20 other Federal Agencies assigned to the task force, only four local agencies have full-time 
participation:  The Seattle Police Department (2); the Bellevue Police Department (1); the Port of Seattle 
Police Department (1), and the Washington State Patrol (1). Each has cited budget issues as precluding 
greater participation in the task force. 
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however, between intelligence entities that have enforcement and arrest powers, like a 
Joint Terrorism Task Force and intelligence analysis only entities like the Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center. 
A concomitant problem exists in that intelligence only entities often suffer 
from a lack of collectors to service their own counterterrorism intelligence requirements. 
In the absence of collectors willing to be tasked with collection requirements and the 
development of human intelligence (HUMINT) networks, the intelligence only centers 
are forced to rely on other people’s intelligence (OPINT)25 to complete their analysis.  
Intelligence professionals understand the difference between tactical 
intelligence and strategic intelligence. Homeland Security professionals, however, often 
conflate the need for strategic intelligence vs. tactical intelligence, emphasizing the 
strategic over the tactical. And yet, from a law enforcement perspective, i.e., tactical 
intelligence leading to tactical warning is the preferred scenario. “The goal is to deter and 
limit damage by identifying in advance when, where and how a declared or potential 
adversary will forcefully strike the United States directly, mount a challenge to U.S. [sic] 
forces, personnel, or interests abroad, or make a menacing weapons breakthrough” 
(Davis, 2003). 
A centralized federal intelligence enterprise, combined with the 
enforcement powers of a Joint Terrorism Task Force, may be the best model for the 
sharing of classified national security intelligence regarding terrorism threats to the 
homeland; however, absent greater vetting and training of local intelligence officers and 
general funding to increase participation by state, local and tribal law enforcement, there 
will be a reluctance to share classified national security intelligence. 
                                                 
25 OPINT, or Other Peoples Intelligence is a term of derision among sworn law enforcement, where 
mediocre intelligence is often traded by individuals untrained in intelligence analysis tradecraft, and who 
staff analyst positions. 
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3. Option Three 
a. The National Counterterrorism Center  
The National Counterterrorism Center was established by Presidential 
Executive Order No. 13354 in August 2004 and codified by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It is responsible for both joint operational planning 
and joint intelligence. It developed out of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, created 
in 2003, which became the National Counterterrorism Center’s intelligence analysis 
branch and which was, in effect, a fusion center, staffed by officials from the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Counterterrorism Division (National counterterrorism center:  About us, 2010). 
The Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act gave the National 
Counterterrorism Center the authority to determine what the “strategic operational 
planning” (IRTPA, 2004, p. 37) task would entail and how it would work. The National 
Counterterrorism Center was created to focus on putting together all of the various pieces 
of the intelligence puzzle, both foreign and domestic, and provide warning to the 
intelligence community of terrorist threats to the homeland (Treverton, 2005). 
By law, the National Counterterrorism Center serves as the primary 
organization in the United States Government for integrating and analyzing all 
intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively 
to domestic terrorism) (Executive Order No. 13354, 2004). As stated in the 9/11 
Commission Report (Kean & Hamilton, 2004), the National Counterterrorism Center 
concept implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission:  “Breaking the older 
mold of national government organizations, this NCTC [sic] should be a center for joint 
operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various 
agencies” (p. 403). 
The National Counterterrorism Center is also the progeny of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and was established “as an 
extra-agency entity constructed by providing personnel from key participating agencies 
including state and local authorities” (Grave de Peralta, 2010, p. 73). Similar to the 
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Director of National Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of 
National Counterterrorism Center reports directly to the President “on the conduct of 
strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities for integrating all elements 
of U.S. national power” (Maguire, 2008). The Director also reports to the Director for 
National Intelligence as the primary organization in the U.S. government for analysis and 
integration of all terrorism intelligence (Best, 2010; National counterterrorism center:  
About us, 2010). 
b. National Fusion Center Model26 
The concept of a National Fusion Center with responsibility for the 
integration of intelligence collection and analysis across all 71 state and local fusion 
centers has long been viewed as a logical outcome of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office Intelligence and Analysis by state, local and tribal law enforcement and 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police. And so, it has attempted to become. 
Through the development of Homeland Security Standing Information Needs (HSEC 
SINs), the Department of Homeland Security has attempted to establish a “foundation for 
information collection activities within the department and provide other Intelligence 
Community and Homeland Security Enterprise members the ability to focus their 
collection, analytic and reporting assets in support of the homeland security mission” 
(More about the office of intelligence and analysis mission, 2012). 
c. Problems with the National Counterterrorism Center/National 
Fusion Center Policy Option 
Problems with the National Counterterrorism Center/National Fusion 
Center, as a viable classified intelligence sharing policy option model focus on the need 
for classified domestic, intelligence collection requirements to improve the collection of 
national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. One of the 
prevailing arguments within the United States Intelligence Community against the 
                                                 
26 According to the fusion center guidelines, a fusion center is defined as “a collaborative effort of two 
or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of 
maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity” (Fusion 
Center Guidelines, 2005, p. 2). 
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involvement of state, local and tribal law enforcement in the collection of national 
security intelligence is that all intelligence—both foreign and domestic—is collection 
requirements driven.  
Intelligence collection requirements constitute the roadmap by which all 
members of the United States Intelligence Community support national security policy. 
Most requirements involve the collection of strategic intelligence, rather than tactical 
intelligence, and no current intelligence requirements, foreign or domestic, are directed to 
state, local or tribal law enforcement agencies for collection by the over 800,000 police 
officers working within the continental United States. 
More importantly, neither the National Counterterrorism Center nor the 
National Fusion Center has responsibility for directing a cadre of intelligence officers 
who are in a position to act on collection requirements in support of the greater United 
States Intelligence Community and serve as collectors. Rather the entire intelligence 
community is responsible for addressing intelligence requirement—but only as the 
requirements conform to individual agency intelligence mission sets. For example, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation may collect pertinent intelligence through one of its 
ongoing investigations that meets an intelligence requirement, but they will not actively 
seek to collect that type of intelligence unless directed to as part of its own domestic 
intelligence collection mission. It is this authority to direct an agency to collect against 
intelligence requirements that the National Counterterrorism Center currently lacks. 
Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency may actively seek to collect 
internationally against counterterrorism requirements but in the past has been known to 
fail to pass classified intelligence on to the rest of the community for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which includes the fact that assisting domestic law enforcement 
is not part of their primary intelligence mission (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). The case of 
Khaled al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, as described in The Looming Tower, 
exemplifies the type of intelligence sharing problems that can occur when intelligence 
collection and analysis centers like the National Counterterrorism Center, have no line 
authority over the collectors of intelligence (Wright, 2006). 
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As the threat within the United States has shifted over the years from one 
focused on the threat from transnational adversaries—i.e., al-Qa’ida Core and al-Qa’ida 
affiliate members—to domestic, self-radicalized individuals who are inspired rather than 
directed by al-Qa’ida, restricting information or collected intelligence solely to that 
having an international nexus is problematic for the implementation of any policy 
designed to provide a basis for the collection of classified national security intelligence. 
Classified intelligence collection does not occur by happenstance. Many 
intelligence experts agree classified strategic intelligence collection is the product of a 
deliberative process based on the intelligence cycle (McGaffin, 2003; Lowenthal, 2008). 
To incorporate state, local and tribal law enforcement as a value added component of the 
United States Intelligence Community, a clearly articulated plan or procedure for the 
development and dissemination of targeted national security intelligence requirements for 
the collection of tactical intelligence designed specifically for state, local and tribal law 
enforcement is needed. 
As noted by the Department of Homeland Security in their Privacy Impact 
Statement (2008): 
At the heart of fusion centers lies law enforcement intelligence, a concept 
that is distinct from “intelligence” as most Americans think of the term, 
national security intelligence. Understanding the distinction is important.  
Information is the key to intelligence, of whatever kind. Information has 
been defined as “pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identifies persons, 
evidence, events, or illustrates processes that indicate the incidence of a 
criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a criminal event.” In the law 
enforcement or criminal context, information includes criminal histories 
and driving records; statements by witnesses, informants, and suspects; 
vehicle registration information; banking and other financial information; 
and police reports. (p. 14) 
What state, local and tribal law enforcement lack are systems to set 
requirements, capture the collection, and facilitate distribution or dissemination. This was 
the role originally envisioned in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 for the National Counterterrorism Center (IRTPA, 2004). Nevertheless, 
disseminating those requirements, capturing the results of collection and its subsequent 
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dissemination remains problematic. The e-Guardian system—an unclassified internet 
based tracking system developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and managed by 
Law Enforcement Online—may provide the means to achieve widespread dissemination 
of intelligence and “near real-time sharing and tracking of terror information and 
suspicious activities” with state, local and tribal law enforcement. e-Guardian is a spin-
off of a similar, but classified tool, also called Guardian used internally by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for tracking informational terrorism leads (Rogero, 2008). 
The nascent and often-times conflicted and confused state of fusion 
centers around the country—as evidenced by the recent findings by the Department of 
Justice, Office of Inspector General Report on fusion centers (Federal support for and 
involvement in state and local fusion centers, 2012)—has resulted in significant criticism 
and lack of confidence in the state and local fusion center system by the Congress. In 
addition, the establishment of Joint Regional Intelligence Groups by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation has further muddled the process of which agency has responsibility for 
the analysis and sharing of domestic national security intelligence within the United 
States (Downing & Mayer, 2012). 
The authors of the 9/11 Commission Report concluded that responsibility 
for managing classified national security intelligence should be delegated to a National 
Counterterrorism Center (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). An argument can be made that for 
domestic classified intelligence collections, collocation of both the source of intelligence 
requirements and the means for management of the various components of the 
intelligence cycle would enhance management of the intelligence cycle and improve 
analysis of intelligence products. 
4. Option Four  
a. The British Special Branch Model 
Of all the policy option models examined by various post-9/11 panels and 
commissions, the British Special Branch model generated both the most interest and the 
most confusion among both academics and intelligence professionals in discussing 
possibilities for the reformation of United States domestic intelligence services. For the 
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most part, academic analysis of the British model has focused on the British Security 
Service (MI-5), rather than on the local law enforcement Special Branches, as a potential 
domestic intelligence replacement model for the United States Intelligence Community. 
Local Special Branches—which function as force multipliers for the counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence community in Great Britain—contribute to the effectiveness of the 
British Security Service as a domestic security intelligence agency by providing expertise 
in law enforcement, criminal and domestic intelligence (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). 
The primary difference between the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the collection and sharing of classified domestic national security intelligence 
with state, local and tribal law enforcement is the Special Branches. The British manner 
of incorporating local police officials, through cleared and vetted police officers 
designated to a “special branch” within each of the 43 local police agencies and the 
London Metropolitan Police Department is unique to Great Britain. No concomitant 
system of vetting state, local and tribal law enforcement officers exists in the United 
States, except for those limited number of local law enforcement officers attached to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 
Unlike within the United States where the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
serves as both an intelligence agency and a law enforcement agency, “the [United 
Kingdom] separates its domestic intelligence function executed primarily by the [British 
Security Service] from its law enforcement function executed by the Metropolitan Police 
Service and the other [43 United Kingdom] police agencies. Thus, the British Security 
Service must rely on one of its more crucial partners for law enforcement powers—the 
local police” (Treverton, 2008, p. 63, as cited by Heck, 2009, p. 37). Because of their lack 
of law enforcement powers, the Special Branch system developed as a means of 
providing “functional law enforcement powers” (Heck, 2009, p. 37) to the British 
Security Service. 
Founded in 1829, the Metropolitan Police Force, deployed plain-clothes 
officers to gather political intelligence almost from its inception. In 1883, the 
Metropolitan Police Service formed a Special Irish Branch as the intelligence service of 
the police force to address a campaign of Irish Republican bomb attacks being waged 
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throughout England (Hewitt, 2008). According to Gregory Treverton, “the Home 
Secretary setup a parallel “Secret Service” to assist the Branch, but the result was more 
infighting than crime fighting, and the new service was sharply curtailed, leaving the 
Special Branch to keep tabs on Irish and other potential enemies within” (Treverton, 
2008, p. 57). 
The British Special Branch system is characterized by each of the separate 
police department in the United Kingdom having specially selected and vetted police 
officers, who have received intelligence officer training, resident within each police 
department’s investigative branch. These Special Branch officers are the law enforcement 
arm of the British Security Service and are vetted to conduct their own national security 
investigations within strict parameters. Referred to by the British as collectors of 
“security intelligence,” Special Branch officers are involved in “both collection and all-
source analysis for internal security purposes” (Herman, 2008, p. 348). 
Over the years, Special Branch took on responsibility for combating a 
wide range of extremist and terrorist activity. Special Branch provides operational 
support to British Security Service and the “street-level affinity” for the targeting of 
“covert human intelligence, who [sic] are then managed by an SB [sic] unilaterally or 
together with MI5 [sic]” (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004, p.13). In many cases, Special Branch 
assumes responsibility for gathering, collating and exploiting intelligence on extremist 
political and terrorist activity and disseminating intelligence for operational use.  
The British Special Branch model allows local police officers to be privy 
to classified intelligence on major investigations throughout the United Kingdom when a 
documented need to share exists. As noted by New York Police Detective Sergeant 
Gustavo Rodriguez, local police are considered critical to the development of human 
intelligence, confidential human sources, electronic surveillance and physical 
surveillance in support of British national security investigations and interests 
(Rodriguez, 2011). As a result, the sharing of intelligence across agency lines is the norm 
rather than the exception in Great Britain (Alexander, 2009). The goal of the any new 
American classified intelligence collection and sharing policy would be the opportunity 
for members of individual police agencies to apply for training and vetting of their 
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intelligence units as certified intelligence officers of the United States Intelligence 
Community in support of human intelligence collection efforts. 
b. The American Version of Special Branch 
As proposed, this policy model would establish an American version of 
the British Special Branch in the form of a National Police Intelligence Corps that would 
mirror the Special Branch system and be comprised of trained and vetted state, local and 
tribal law enforcement officers who would provide “local police expertise; provide a 
local network of HUMINT [sic] sources; [be] a conduit to the rest of the local police 
force; provide local contingency CT [sic] planning” (Smith, 2010, cited by Rodriguez, 
2011, p. 42). Police officers trained and certified by members of the Intelligence Corps 
would return to their individual police departments to serve as local counterterrorism 
intelligence liaison officers, collecting and sharing classified intelligence with the United 
States Intelligence Community, developing confidential human sources to be shared with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in criminal and national security counterterrorism 
investigations, and assist in the development of domestic classified national security 
intelligence requirements. 
The National Police Intelligence Corps would be managed and funded by 
the Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Analysis Division and overseen 
by the Director of National Intelligence, becoming an ex officio 18th member of the 
United States Intelligence Community, limited in scope by Congressional statute. 
Alternately, the National Police Intelligence Corps could serve under the auspices of the 
National Counterterrorism Center or the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. In either 
case, the National Police Intelligence Corps could be tasked to provide a classified 
collection and sharing capability that neither entity currently posses. 
In the recommended policy model, the Department of Homeland Security 
would provide vetted state, local and tribal law enforcement officers with funded 
intelligence officer training and certification. All training for the National Police 
Intelligence Corps would be similar to training provided the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s National Clandestine Service case officers and the Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation’s National Security Branch special agents. The Director of National 
Intelligence and the Attorney General of the United States would approve the curriculum 
and tradecraft training as intelligence officers in order to conform to current investigative 
and intelligence collection restrictions outlined in the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ 
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guidelines (2011). All requirements for 
consideration as national security intelligence officers with access to classified 
intelligence, sensitive compartmented information, and national security collection 
requirements would be met by this training. 
Each member of this cadre of certified police intelligence liaison officers 
would be cleared for the receipt of classified information up to, and including the Top 
Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information level, along with generally recognized 
handling caveats and special program access. Coordination of the collection efforts of 
state, local and tribal officers with the United States Intelligence Community would 
remain under the oversight of the National Security Council (Best, 2010).  
The American policy model would differ from the British Special Branch 
system in that the recommended policy option would not include the sharing of 
nonclassified intelligence on purely domestic political groups that are suspected of 
engaging in criminal terrorist activities, such as bank robbery or drug dealing, or where 
1st Amendment issues predominate. In those cases, intelligence regarding purely 
domestic terrorism would be segregated from classified national security intelligence 
regarding international terrorism and would be shared with state, local and tribal law 
enforcement under existing criminal intelligence agreements with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces or criminal squads. 
The recommended American policy would also differ from similar 
appearing systems already in existence in the United States such as the Terrorism Liaison 
Officer 27  program managed by the Los Angeles Police Department’s Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center: 
                                                 
27 TLO.org provides Terrorism Liaison Officers and Fusion Liaison Officers with easy-to-access 
unclassified information regarding threats, trends, and news items of interest. TLO.org is managed by the 
Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center. (TLO.org, 2010). 
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The [Terrorism Liaison Officer] mission is to develop a network of 
trained, coordinated first responders in various disciplines to function as 
the local eyes and ears in the war on terrorism. TLOs [sic] operate within 
the framework of a local TEWG [sic][terrorism early warning group] or 
state fusion center and assist in intelligence collection. They assist 
information dissemination to the various disciplines they represent. 
(Morrissey, 2007, p. 42) 
Michael Grossman noted, “Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Los Angeles County organized a Terrorism Advisory Group…One of the policy models 
that developed from this effort was that each members of the group would designate a 
Terrorism Liaison Officer.” As described by Grossman, “These officers are the central 
point of contact for all terrorism-related information—but not classified intelligence—for 
their respective agencies” (Grossman, 2005, p. 24). While Grossman was prescient in his 
recognition of a need for an intelligence liaison function within the Los Angeles 
Terrorism Advisory Group, the terrorism liaison officer program has “created a pathway 
for information flow a coordination among the participating cities” (p. 24) as noted, it 
does not address the collection of classified and sharing of national security intelligence. 
c. Problems with the Special Branch Policy Option 
A problem with any classified intelligence collection and sharing proposal 
based on the British Special Branch system are the significant differences that exist, both 
politically and within the structure of the United Kingdom’s intelligence and law 
enforcement apparatus. The United Kingdom is a much smaller country than the United 
States, with a law enforcement structure that is managed locally but directed nationally 
by the British Home office. The United Kingdom also lacks the concept of Federalism, 
whereby individual states in the American union understand that “powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people” (10th Amendment—U.S. Constitution, n.d.). 
Terrorism liaison officers—the model most closely resembling the 
proposed National Police Intelligence Corps policy model—are not currently trained and 
vetted in classified intelligence tradecraft and collection, nor are they trained and vetted 
in the protection of classified sources and methods. Anecdotally, problems have 
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developed within the Terrorism Liaison Program wherein a single terrorism liaison 
officer is accused of unauthorized release of classified information resulting in the 
decision to exclude all members of the group. The net effect being that where the 
terrorism liaison group used to meet monthly to exchange information, this particular 
group has now not met for over a year (Mata, personal communication, 2010). Any new 
national policy option would need to address these and other sensitive issues and would 
require the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence for true access to 
classified intelligence platforms. 
A third problem with any National Police Intelligence Corps policy model 
as proposed is that—absent strict protocols regarding dissemination of classified 
intelligence and strong leadership from within the United States Intelligence 
Community—the policy will remain subject to the whims and foibles of whatever entity 
controls access to the classified information. While not insurmountable, this problem is 
significant and has been noted elsewhere in this thesis. Overcoming United States 
Intelligence Community prejudice against the law enforcement community requires 
leadership by both the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Director of National Intelligence.  
Coordination of investigative and collection efforts also remains a 
significant problem related to any proposed intelligence policy change. As noted by 
McGee and Duffy (1996), “[Coordination] sounds simple in concept. In reality, it is 
likely to prove difficult, challenging constitutional limits on domestic law enforcement 
activity while drawing intelligence officers ever closer to proceedings that could 
compromise sources and methods” (p. 373). As was seen in the Najibullah Zazi 
investigation, once information controlled by the FBI was released to the New York Joint 
Terrorism Task Force and thereafter to the New York Police Department’s Intelligence 
Unit, control of the classified information was lost (Sulzberger, 2010) potentially 
compromising the sensitive sources and methods that originally developed the 
intelligence. 
Finally, this proposed policy model comes at a time when the British 
Special Branch model upon which it is based has itself transformed into a model more 
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closely resembling the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 2006, the Metropolitan Police 
Service merged their Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13) and Special Branch (SO12) and 
formed Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) (Metropolitan police:  Counter terrorism 
command, 2012). By forming this new command, the Metropolitan Police tacitly 
acknowledged that the ability to bring law enforcement resources to bear is as important 
as the collection and sharing of classified and unclassified intelligence about terrorism by 
members of the intelligence services. At the same time, “it continues their legacy of 
expertise and brings together intelligence, operations and investigations functions. It also 
engages with a range of partners to prevent terrorist related activity, including the British 
Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service” (Metropolitan police:  Counter 
terrorism command, 2012). The question remains, however, why become more like the 
British, when the British are becoming more like the Americans? 
C. POLICY OPTIONS MATRIX: 




Table 1.   Policy Options Analysis Matrix 
Should Cops Be 
Spies? 


























Reporting Initiative  
NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
FBI/Joint Terrorism 
Task Force Model YES Limited






NO Limited** NO NO NO NO YES NO 
American Version of 
British "Special 
Branch" Model 
YES YES YES YES YES YES UNK! YES 
                                                 
* Classified intelligence sharing under the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Model is considered limited due to its being restricted to only those 
members of the JTTF and the Executive Board who maintain Secret clearances. 
** Classified intelligence sharing under the National Counterterrorism Model/National Fusion Center Model is considered limited because 
intelligence sharing is restricted to among the 17 members of the United States Intelligence Community. 
! The political viability of the British “Special Branch” model is unknown at this time due to an inability to gauge the overall acceptance level of 
expanding classified intelligence to state, local and tribal law enforcement by the United States Intelligence Community.  There are many within the 
Intelligence Community that would be opposed to this model. 
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D. RELEVANCE TO THE AMERICAN POLICE INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING PARADIGM 
The domestic terrorism threat facing the United States is increasingly complex, 
adaptive and evolving (Mueller, 2012). It continues to include threats from an 
international Salafi Jihadi movement tied to a conservative Islamist theology advanced by 
Usama bin Laden and al Qa’ida, but also from local threats posed by traditional domestic 
rejectionist movements, left and right wing activists, violent animal rights and ecology 
based groups, the neo-Nazi movement and religious extremists including numerous 
variants of British Israelism, Christian Identity and Germanic neo-paganism. 
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has noted that a critical need 
continues to exist for a national domestic intelligence collection policy that is “threat-
focused, intelligence-driven [and] guided by clear operational strategies.” In addition, the 
policy should “remain firmly committed to carrying out these strategies under guidelines 
established by the attorney general that protect the civil liberties of those entrusting us 
with the authorities to carry out our mission” (Mueller, 2012).  
Accurate intelligence is crucial to disrupting the entire criminal and terrorism 
threat variants faced by state, local and tribal law enforcement, including those still posed 
by al Qa’ida and its affiliates and is considered a matter of top United States foreign 
policy (Walsh, 2010). Intelligence sharing between the United States Intelligence 
Community and state, local and tribal law enforcement is therefore critical to a vibrant 
and coherent domestic homeland security intelligence policy that is desperately in need of 
a new paradigm, without turning American police into a modern day Gestapo. 
A national police force has always been an anathema to the democratic principles 
upon which the United States was founded and an infringement on the concept of 
Federalism embodied in the 10th amendment to the Constitution; however, modern-day 
technological evolution demands the ability to quickly share classified and unclassified 
intelligence across state lines with state, local and tribal law enforcement. As a national 
issue, the challenge is to create a system designed, sanctioned and advanced by the 
United States Intelligence Community, and supported by the American police community 
across the country. 
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But in many ways and for many political reasons, local law enforcement and the 
police intelligence community is incapable of forging an integrated solution; rather it has 
become part of the homeland security intelligence-sharing problem. Major metropolitan 
police departments have contributed to the classified intelligence-sharing debacle by 
moving away from their traditional role of developing tactical intelligence for the purpose 
of crime prevention—including terrorism—and towards a domestic national clandestine 
service model based on the Central Intelligence Agency’s foreign intelligence collection 
mission (AP’s Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations, 2012). 
American law enforcement has embraced this change becoming—like the Central 
Intelligence Agency—more militarized in the process (Rizer & Hartman, 2011) and less 
focused on traditional criminal intelligence gathering techniques (Baker, 2011). Recent 
calls for change in the Central Intelligence Agency mirror the domestic police 
intelligence enterprise need to “halt…creeping militarization and restore it to what it does 
best:  collecting human intelligence” (Johnson, 2012). One could add the prevention of 
crime as well. 
As a result of creeping clandestinity, the development of criminal confidential 
human sources and human intelligence networks has fallen into disrepute. This shift in 
domestic intelligence collection, from one focused on penetrating and recruiting members 
of terrorist cells, to one with an eye for investigating 1st Amendment protected free 
speech and uncovering the political and religious motivations of potential terrorism 
subjects is both potentially illegal and suggestive of a significant gap in the understanding 
of past police intelligence operations (Document shows NYPD eyed Shiites based on 
religion, 2012). This shift mirrors one occurring within the intelligence community itself. 
As recently noted by Joshua Foust, a Fellow at the American Security Project: 
Over the last decade of counterterrorism operations, the U.S. intelligence 
community (IC) has undergone a remarkable transformation. A relatively 
modest part of the national security community before the 9/11 attacks, by 
2010 the IC had swelled to encompass nearly a million people largely 
focused on prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global 




their traditional role of analyzing a broad range of current events for 
policymakers and toward supporting the global counterterrorism mission. 
(Foust, 2012) 
Disclosures in the media regarding the activities of the New York Police 
Department’s Intelligence Unit (Apuzzo, Goldman, Sullivan, & Hawley, 2012) are also 
indicative of the degree to which cops have envisioned reinventing themselves to become 
domestic spies. To alleviate this tendency on the part of police, some have proposed the 
implementation of a domestic Interpol, or Domestipol, “a national system of police 
coordination amongst police departments in cities within the DHS’s [sic] Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) program” that would incorporate a domestic intelligence 
sharing apparatus among the 50 largest police departments where, “as per DHS [sic] a 
significant risk of a terrorist attack exists” (Rodriguez, 2011, p. 50). 
The homeland security and law enforcement communities can and should reverse 
this trend. Domestic police intelligence collection and sharing needs to return to it roots 
focusing on criminal behavior rather than the collection of political intelligence. While 
the police counterterrorism mission can and should continue, it should be placed within 
the context of classified national security intelligence that is indicative of criminal 
activity and networks that are violating federal, state and local laws. By integrating the 
deep criminal intelligence collection capabilities of local police with the vast 
international intelligence collection capabilities built over the last decade by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, the homeland security 
community can generate the knowledge it needs to prevent terrorism, protect the public 
and make smart decisions to ensure America's long–term security interests. 
It is through this lens that the need for a new post-9/11, classified intelligence 
collection and sharing policy model is proposed; a model that incorporates training and 
vetting approved by the Director of National Intelligence, is sanctioned and supported by 
the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency, and 
















The primary question of this thesis—whether or not state, local and tribal law 
enforcement should be involved in the collection and sharing of classified national 
security intelligence in support of national counterterrorism efforts—is difficult to answer 
in an empirically valid sense.  
Any classified domestic intelligence collection policy model that allows for the 
intrusive reach of domestic police agencies into the lives of American citizens strikes at 
the core of who we are as a people. Domestic intelligence collection and sharing does not 
just mean the sharing of foreign or domestic intelligence collected on non-U.S. persons, 
but often also means the collecting and sharing of intelligence on United States citizens 
within the homeland. This thesis attempts to put forward an alternative to the status quo 
and argues greater sharing of classified domestic national security intelligence with state, 
local and tribal law enforcement, along with increased classified collection by law 
enforcement, is necessary to ensure the prompt mitigation of terrorist threats. 
The implicit objective of this thesis was, however, to answer the abstract 
question—whether or not cops should be spies. While this question is more 
argumentative than practical, it remains the fundamental philosophical issue affecting 
democratic policing in the United States. America remains the safest, freest and most 
prosperous nation the world has ever known. It is, however, this same freedom that 
makes us vulnerable to both international and domestic terrorism. The issue is—and 
continues to be—a domestic political struggle to strike a balance between “winning the 
battle against the terrorists and losing the ideological28 war that created them” (Collins, 
2006, p. 45). The question of exactly how much intrusive investigative authority to grant 
to state, local and tribal law enforcement to enhance domestic classified intelligence 
collection remains:  Should cops be spies? According to Frank Cilluffo: 
                                                 
28 A separate argument can be made as to whether an ideological, or “Cosmic War” (Juergensmeyer, 
2003; Aslan, 2008) can ever be won or lost at all. 
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…the role of U.S. intelligence cannot be minimized; it will be Uncle 
Sam’s lifeblood in the campaign against terrorism. Accurate and timely 
information is the foundation of every element of this campaign, including 
U.S. diplomatic, military, financial, and political operations; it also 
provides warning of future attacks. (Cilluffo, Marks & Salmoiraghi, 2002, 
p. 61) 
In the almost ten years since the events of 9/11, the United States Intelligence 
Community has evolved through the “wisdom that comes from sad experience” (Teller, 
1958, p. 201). Yet significant shortcomings in the collection, analysis and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence remain because the United States Intelligence 
Community continues to restrict granting access to classified national security 
intelligence affecting the homeland to state, local and tribal law enforcement. Recent 
events have highlighted a significant issue regarding the cops versus spies’ conundrum 
with the revelation that the New York City Police Department employed active duty 
intelligence officers assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as full-time intelligence 
collection and tradecraft advisors. By law, “The C.I.A. [sic] is prohibited from gathering 
intelligence on American soil, but some have criticized its counterterrorism cooperation 
with law enforcement services as a de facto domestic spying campaign” (Mazzetti, 2011, 
p. A31). Other articles published by the Associated Press have highlighted the New York 
City Police Department’s extensive surveillance of the general Muslim community, not 
just in New York, but also in the tri-state area (Apuzzo, Goldman, Sullivan & Hawley, 
2012). 
While mitigating the threat from domestic and international terrorist groups is the 
primary objective of law enforcement intelligence, classified or otherwise, the primary 
purpose of collecting classified domestic intelligence, particularly homeland security 
intelligence is not—as asserted by Lowenthal (2008) and others—to inform policy 
makers to help achieve policy goals, but sometimes rather “to exploit and leverage, to 
prevent, preempt and disrupt terrorist activities before they occur…The first priority 
should always be to get there before the bomb goes off” (Cilluffo, Marks & Salmoiraghi, 
2002, p. 61). 
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The intelligence cycle, as it is applied to domestic counterterrorism, begins with 
collection driven by requirements and ends with enforcement action designed to mitigate 
the threat. When mitigating domestic threats to the homeland, the domestic intelligence 
collection process begins and ends with same person, the law enforcement collector. In 
recent history—at least since 9/11—this role has primarily been the responsibility of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
In his book, Enemies of Intelligence:  Knowledge and Power in American 
National Security, (2006) Richard Betts noted: 
The main failure before September 11 was the insufficient collection of 
unambiguous information. Dots must be collected before they can be 
connected. The more dots, the more likely that two or three will show 
directly when, where, or how an assault might come. (Kindle Edition, 
location 1399) 
Following the signing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, the RAND Corporation declared: 
The intelligence culture of secrecy and “need to know” is dangerously out 
of date and suggested that the intelligence community would be improved 
by consulting people who have no “need to know” but bring a different 
perspective and might see patterns the ostensible experts do not. 
(Treverton, 2005, p. vii) 
The RAND analysis, like many outside of the intelligence community, presumes 
the problem is merely one of access to restricted intelligence by analysts outside the 
formal intelligence community. This thesis argues, however, in regards to domestic 
counterterrorism investigations, access to specific classified domestic intelligence by law 
enforcement entities to improve classified national security intelligence collection, is the 
key to improving threat mitigation within the continental United States. The conclusion, 
particularly as it relates to the ability of state, local and tribal law enforcement to 
understand and collect classified national security intelligence, is the proposal of a policy 
option, which could incorporate large numbers of police officers from agencies large and 
small into the national security paradigm. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
Modern domestic counterterrorism investigations depend to an increasing degree 
on highly sensitive classified intelligence collected overseas and domestically. Some of 
the most sensitive classified intelligence collected by components of the intelligence 
community does not easily translate into unclassified products for the use of state, local 
and tribal law enforcement. Intelligence collected by the National Security Agency and 
confidential human source intelligence are two primary examples. 
Many of the subjects of domestic counterterrorism investigations are functionally 
invisible to state, local and tribal law enforcement authorities absent classified briefings 
from federal investigators. Thus, national security intelligence investigations in general, 
and classified intelligence collection by state, local and tribal law enforcement in 
particular, becomes increasingly difficult without access to classified national intelligence 
collection requirements. This should not be occurring. 
Almost ten years after the events of 9/11, and now following the death of Usama 
bin Laden, those of us employed within the law enforcement arms of the United States 
Intelligence Community continue to see cases that cross the classified/unclassified divide. 
Recent arrests of Homegrown Violent Extremists in Chicago (Headly/Rana), New York 
(Zazi, Shahzad), Portland (Mohamud), Dallas (Aldawsari) and most recently in Spokane 
(Harpham), Clarkston (Brice) and Seattle (Latif/Mujahidh), have emphasized the need to 
have state, local and tribal officers who are cleared to the Top Secret, Sensitive 
Compartmented Information level involved in the investigation in order that important 
background and investigative information be shared. All of the above cases, with the 
exception of Harpham, were investigated utilizing classified collection techniques 
authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
So how does state, local and tribal law enforcement uncover and collect classified 
domestic counterterrorism intelligence when the agencies charged as first responders/first 
preventers do not even know what they are looking for? Few things are impossible to 
detect; however, it may actually be impossible to detect a clandestine intelligence officer 
whose training is based on nondetection. Many of the most dangerous al-Qa’ida core 
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operatives were trained or are training at this level of clandestine operation. In this sense, 
the current state of national security investigations at the state, local and tribal level is 
strongly weighted against effective intelligence collection and mitigation, unless the 
United States Intelligence Community shares critical national security intelligence. 
Almost ten years after the United States invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to 
wipe out Usama bin Ladin and the remnants of al-Qa’ida senior leadership to insure 
against future surprise attack, the United States Intelligence Community in general—and 
the homeland security community in particular—are still arguing about access and 
dissemination of classified national security intelligence. Today we have to consider that 
the philosophy of al-Qa’ida, like a ball of mercury dropped onto a piece of glass, has 
subdivided into multiple small franchises of the original:  McTerrorism at its most 
efficient. Without greater utilization of the classified intelligence tools at hand, the 
homeland remains as vulnerable today, as it was on 09/10/2001. 
A terrorist is easily noticed only if their nefarious activities, i.e., clandestine 
preparation for terrorism, are carried out in the most obvious manner. There can be no 
doubt if a terrorist wants to carry out preparations for a terrorist act in secrecy, detection 
will become difficult and uncertain, particularly if the terrorist is a true lone wolf 
offender (Spaaij, 2012). As is well known within the law enforcement community, in the 
contest between the drug dealer and the police, the drug dealer has the greater advantage. 
All of this is far less important than the question:  How do we both collect and 
share critical national security and counterterrorism intelligence without violating the 
intelligence community principles of secrecy and need to know? 
According to James Burch (2007): 
…the challenge in developing a viable national security collection 
capability [for state, local and tribal law enforcement] centers on how to 
organize these capabilities optimally within the larger U.S. [sic] 
intelligence framework, how to ensure streamlined information sharing 
between foreign intelligence and the multitude of law enforcement 
agencies, and how best to implement oversight mechanisms to protect 
civil liberties and ensure accountability of intelligence operations (p. 1). 
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The review of the literature was clear on several points. The first was that neither 
Intelligence-Led Policing nor the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
work as a policy model for the collection of classified national security intelligence by 
state, local and tribal law enforcement. Absent clear direction from the United States 
Intelligence Community as a whole—in the form of classified intelligence collection 
requirements tailored for dissemination to cleared and vetted, intelligence-trained police 
officers resident within nonfederal law enforcement agencies—the process by which 
intelligence collection is formulated—the intelligence collection cycle—cannot be 
completed. 
The second point revealed by both the literature review and the policy analysis 
was that a model does exist that incorporates local and national intelligence components, 
as well as law enforcement and purely intelligence functions, into a seamless integration 
of talents. The model policy is best represented by an American adaptation of the British 
Special Branch system.  
In evaluating the relevance of the primary thesis question concerning whether or 
not state, local and tribal law enforcement can make a significant contribution to the 
classified national security intelligence collection effort, it is helpful to keep in mind the 
war on terror is a “shifting security paradigm” (Andreas & Price, 2001, p. 32). In the war 
on terror, preventive policing and proactive domestic intelligence collection have taken 
their rightful place alongside overseas warfare as a means to prevent terrorism in the 
homeland. As noted by Andreas and Price, “the traditionally distant relationship between 
law enforcement and the intelligence community has become far more intimate.” In the 
past, “…law enforcement was largely a domestic matter, and intelligence was focused 
primarily on geopolitical rivalries” (pp. 41–42). Now that al-Qa’ida, through its 
surrogates and franchisees—as well as through its core operatives—has brought the war 
on terror to the homeland, a significant argument can be made that there has been a 
convergence of war fighting and crime fighting. 
The key to answering is dependent upon support at the federal level for the 
development of classified intelligence collection requirements tailored to the state, local 
and tribal law enforcement community. 
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Writing in Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Karen Guttieri (2003) stated about the [then] new National Strategy 
for Homeland Security (White House, 2002), “implementing the new national security 
strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and jurisdictions of authority” 
(p. 1). The objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security are to “1) prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States; 2) reduce American vulnerability to terrorism; 
3) minimize damage caused by terrorist attacks that do occur; and 4) recover from 
terrorist attacks” (White House, 2002, revised 2007, cited in Guttieri, 2003, p. 7). 
Inasmuch as prevention is a key component of the strategy, the collection of classified 
domestic national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement is a 
significant, but underdeveloped element in the nation’s overall United States Intelligence 
Community strategy for preventing terrorism. As noted by Lowenthal, “Collection is the 
bedrock of intelligence…without collection, intelligence is little more than guesswork—
perhaps educated guesswork, but guesswork nonetheless” (2009, p. 69). 
A significant concomitant problem exists in that no single definition of domestic 
intelligence, national security intelligence, or homeland security intelligence exists within 
the framework of the United States Intelligence Community. Despite the findings of the 
911 Commission over six years ago, no single integrated intelligence collection plan for 
the prevention of terrorism that incorporates the efforts of state, local and tribal law 
enforcement exists within the United States Intelligence Community. Nor does an 
integrated national strategy for the collection of domestic intelligence exist. In order for 
state, local and tribal law enforcement to address its natural order within homeland 
security, there needs to be an understanding of what role state, local and tribal law 
enforcement will play in the overall intelligence collection discipline. 
In regards to the status quo, Intelligence-Led Policing is ineffective primarily due 
to police executives failing to understand the purpose and limitations of Intelligence-Led 
Policing as a tool for the collection of classified national security intelligence. Little 
empirical evidence in the literature or within the law enforcement community suggests 
Intelligence-Led Policing is an effective policy model for the collection of classified 
national security intelligence. This is partly the result of the desire by the United States 
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Intelligence Community to engage in “analysis driven collection,” by which is meant 
intelligence collection priorities “should reflect the intelligence needs of those crafting 
the analysis” (Lowenthal, p. 78). The lack of domestic national security intelligence 
collection requirements inhibits the ability of state, local and tribal law enforcement 
agencies to effectively direct local counterterrorism collection efforts. 
The national security intelligence collection role which state, local and tribal law 
enforcement can assume in support of the United States Intelligence Community is 
critical to the success of the global war on terror because “criminal and terrorist 
networks…constitute a departure from traditional criminal activity because they are not 
concentrated in any one local jurisdiction” (Sullivan & Wirtz, 2009, p. 2). Integration and 
coordination of efforts among the United States Intelligence Community, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation—as the agency primarily designated to engage in domestic 
intelligence collection—and state, local and tribal law enforcement is critical to the 
effective prevention of terrorist acts within the United States. 
The current challenge is to devise and implement a proactive and dynamic 
domestic intelligence collection strategy incorporating all elements of the United States 
Intelligence Community to achieve the goal of prevention rather than reaction to 
terrorism (Clutterbuck, 2004, p. 141). In the words of Gabriella Blum and Phillip B. 
Heyman, writing in Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists:  Lessons from the War on Terrorism 
(2010): 
The struggle against international terrorism has not been won. Allegiance 
to the goals and means of Al-Qaeda [sic] has not been ended. To the 
contrary...the phenomenon of terrorism, in one form or another, is here to 
stay, in America and worldwide. Since 9/11, terrorists have struck 
repeatedly in the Middle East, as well as in London, Madrid, Bali, 
Colombia, Russia, and elsewhere (albeit in different forms driven by 
different motivations.)  What we have learned from both the successes and 
the failures of U.S. strategy over the past nine years should provide an 
invaluable guide -- domestically and internationally -- on how to devise an 
effective, legal, legitimate, and politically viable counterterrorism strategy 
for years to come. (pp. xv–xvi) 
In sum, the way forward requires the development of an integrated national 
domestic-intelligence collection policy that leverages the collection capabilities of state, 
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local and tribal law enforcement through the sharing of classified intelligence. It may be, 
after all is said and done, that a centralized federal intelligence enterprise is, in fact, the 
best model for the collection and sharing of classified national security intelligence 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICE INTELLIGENCE POLICY  
1. The National Police Intelligence Corps 
This thesis recommends the Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and 
Analysis Division consider the development and permanent funding of a National Police 
Intelligence Corps and a Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaison Officer training program 
for state, local and tribal law enforcement that would certify officers completing the 
course as intelligence officers of the United States. Modeled on the British “Special 
Branch” system, this program would train, certify and manage local police officers in 
intelligence tradecraft, human intelligence source development, classification of 
intelligence and other topics necessary to the development of a vibrant classified 
intelligence liaison program. Upon completion of their training, National Police 
Intelligence Corps officers would be certified as counterterrorism intelligence liaison 
officers and would be vetted at the Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information 
level. The National Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaison Officers would then serve 
within their individual police departments as force multipliers and adjunct collectors of 
national security intelligence for the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s National Resources Division and state and local fusion centers.  
The National Police Intelligence Corps, similar in structure to the London 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch system, but which at the same time recognizes the 
significant differences between the two nations’ political and law enforcement systems is 
being proposed. The National Police Intelligence Corps would require training, vetting 
and integration of volunteer state, local and tribal law enforcement officers to serve as 
certified counterterrorism intelligence officers in the greater United States Intelligence 
Community. Locally certified intelligence officers would remain with their individual 
departments but would serve a larger intelligence collection policy model, both as a 
conduit for classified national security intelligence collection to and from state, local and 
tribal police officers and as developers of local ad hoc classified intelligence collection 
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requirements. This finding mirrors a current trend within homeland security to establish 
terrorism liaison officers and fusion liaison officers within individual departments who 
have a greater understanding of terrorism threat mitigation, the workings of the United 
States Intelligence Community and access to some—but not all—classified national 
security intelligence. 
In their capacity as intelligence collectors, the locally certified intelligence 
officers would work in close coordination with both the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Resources Division, as well as with other 
members of the intelligence community authorized under federal law to collect classified 
domestic intelligence. The certified intelligence officer would serve primarily as a 
handler of confidential human sources, as well as a developer and collector of classified 
and unclassified human intelligence and would automatically be considered an ad hoc 
member of any local Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force. In 
addition, the certified intelligence officer would be subject to the provisions of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011) 
To mitigate terrorism threats the certified intelligence officer would also be 
cleared to have access to and share classified intelligence developed at the highest levels 
of special access with the United States Intelligence Community. Access would, of 
course, be dependent on the need-to-know, the ability to maintain the appropriate Top 
Secret security clearance and special access privileges appropriate to the level of 
classified intelligence required. In this way, state, local and tribal certified intelligence 
officers would be able to address the problem confronting homeland security, that present 
and future terrorist threats to the United States are “global and adaptive,” and frequently 
“[blur] the distinctions between crime, terrorism, and war” (Treverton, 2005, p. ix). 
Funding for this program would be included within the budget of the United 
States Intelligence Community managed by the Director of National Intelligence. 
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2. A National Strategy for the Collection of Domestic Intelligence 
Concomitant to the development of the National Police Intelligence Corps and the 
National Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaison Officer program, this thesis further 
recommends the Department of Homeland Security—as the department responsible for 
protecting the American people from terrorist threats and understanding the evolving and 
emerging threats which threaten the nation—develop and promulgate, through the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, a National Strategy for the collection of domestic 
intelligence focusing on the collection of classified counterterrorism intelligence. 
This new National Strategy would define domestic counterterrorism intelligence; 
establish a doctrine for the collection of domestic intelligence for the purpose of 
preventing or mitigating terrorism initiating solely within the homeland; and incorporate 
the current Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide used by the United States 
Department of Justice as a policy manual. In this manner, all domestic intelligence 
collection and national security investigations would be conducted in a similar manner by 
all United States law enforcement agencies participating in the recommended National 
Police Intelligence Corps. 
3. Classified and Unclassified Counterterrorism Collection 
Requirements 
This thesis recommends both classified and unclassified national security 
intelligence collection requirements, suitable for dissemination to the general homeland 
security community, be developed and promulgated by both the Departments of 
Homeland Security and the United States Intelligence Community. These intelligence 
collection requirements could then be viewed as taskings from the Intelligence 
Community to the certified intelligence officer program participants. In this manner, the 
participants could be viewed as participating in the overall homeland security effort. 
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B. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Classified Homeland Security Intelligence 
For many intelligence professionals working in the field of homeland security—as 
opposed to military-centric national security—the classification conundrum is the single-
most problematic aspect of intelligence sharing for the purpose of threat mitigation in the 
world of domestic counterterrorism. Over-classification to protect sources and methods 
continues to be a significant problem domestically. If homeland security is to succeed as 
both a profession and an academic discipline, it needs to address the ability of major 
players within homeland security and academia to access and exploit both classified and 
de-classified national security intelligence that directly affects the homeland.  
Who shall designate those major players and what level of access to classified 
intelligence that discloses sources and methods will they be provided—this is the salient 
question and should be subject to significant Congressional review. 
2. The Role of the CIA in the Domestic Intelligence Collection 
The Central Intelligence Agency has a lead role in the development of classified 
intelligence in the overseas war on terrorism. That lead role, however, by law does not 
extend to the investigation and development of intelligence—classified or otherwise—on 
United States Citizens or United States Persons—including corporations—residing within 
the confines of the continental United States (National Security Act, 1947, amended 
2007; Executive Order 12333, 1981, amended 2004). Congress exclusively delegates the 
role of federal domestic intelligence collection against United States citizen to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, along with mandating considerable Congressional and judicial 
oversight. 
Recent revelations by the New York Times, the Associated Press and other media 
outlets, of the involvement and integration of the Central Intelligence Agency into the 
training and oversight of domestic intelligence collection programs by state, local and 
tribal law enforcement is troubling for more that a passel of reasons. While many in 
Congress and elsewhere have argued for the inclusion of the Central Intelligence Agency 
in the collection of domestic intelligence paradigm, such a profound change would 
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unleash a plethora of criticism domestically and potentially mobilize significant right and 
left wing opposition to the changes, leading to an increased state of domestic strife 
unparalleled since the 1960s. 
A review should be conducted of the relevant legislation to determine if the 
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